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During the period from 1949 to 1990, some political analysts argued that West 
Germany had transformed German foreign policy traditions from a Bismarckian 
Machtpolitik (power policy) to a Machtvergessenheit (forgetting and neglecting of 
power policy). Hans-Peter Schwarz, a noted political historian, argued that the 
West Germans had over time accepted a "responsible and moral" and sometimes 
"simplistic" approach to foreign and security policy issues. This thesis examines 
the factors of continuity and change regarding Schwarz's claim of German 
Machtvergessenheit, both before and after Germany's reunification in 1990. 
The thesis concludes that Germany does have national interests which are 
defended by politicians in Bonn. However, these interests and supporting policy 
measures have been purposely limited due to significant domestic and external 
constraints, including a political culture that values restraint. Germans are well 
aware of power political factors and use them within acceptable boundaries. The 
realm of the Federal Republic's contemporary Machtpolitik may be summed up in 
three points: appealing to the public's sense of responsibility to further political 
goals, implementing "assertive" diplomatic and economic measures on occasion, 
and supporting the right of others to use military force. 
The Germans seem reluctant to pursue new "experiments" in foreign policy 
(ones that could prove detrimental to Germany's current position). Moreover, the 
Germans tend to exhibit an attitude of moral aloofness - loathing the idea of German 
participation in risky military operations - and still depend on the United States and 
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This thesis examines the dynamics of Germany's security policy. The 
analysis focuses on Germany's ability to define and defend its national interests and 
to accept international security responsibilities, despite various constraints rooted 
in history, politics, and economics. 
This topic is important because America's agenda is increasingly focused on 
domestic problems, and NATO Europe is expected to accept greater responsibilities 
for international security. Statements by Presidents Bush and Clinton have made 
it clear that Germany is considered the linchpin for such a leadership role. Even 
though France and the United Kingdom have been more active in "out of area" 
operations, Germany is expected to play a central and indispensable role in uniting 
Europe and promoting a more stable international security environment in the 
future. 
During the period from the Second World War to reunification in 1990, most 
West Germans maintained that pursuing a foreign and security policy on the model 
of Bismarckian Machtpolitik (power politics) would be against Germany's interests. 
An overt "power politics" approach in Bonn would have caused anxiety among 
Germany's neighbors and increased instability in Europe. One of Germany's most 
distinguished historians and theorists about international relations, Professor Hans- 
Peter Schwarz of Bonn University, argued that West Germany had transformed 
previous German approaches to security into a Verantwortungspolitik (responsibility 
policy) or a Moralpolitik (morality policy). This led, Schwarz argued, to West 
Germany taking an emphatically "responsible and moral" approach to its foreign 
and security policies and to a "simplistic" neglect, or forgetting, of power political 
considerations {Machtvergessenheit) in international security affairs. Since 








normal" country in international security matters, but it remains to be seen how far 
this will go. 
A "normal" nation-state would, for example, attach a high priority to 
securing its own interests. What evidence suggests that Germany's goal is to 
further a wider European stability, one formed on its own terms? Germany's 
interests include maintaining a strong relationship with the United States through 
NATO, establishing stability through a "deepening and widening" of the European 
Union, redefining its long-standing relationship with France, bringing the Eastern 
states closer to the West, and finally, enhancing Germany's position as a world 
power, with greater influence in the United Nations and other international 
institutions. 
Several constraints, however, limit Germany's ability to assume a greater 
leadership role in international politics. Its political culture, for example, values 
restraint and "reticence" in military activities, owing in part to the "lessons learned" 
in the first half of the twentieth century. The expectations and policies of 
Germany's Eastern neighbors, its partners in the European Union, and the United 
States constitute additional constraints. 
Domestic economic constraints also hinder Germany's efforts to establish 
stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Reunification costs and the social welfare 
economic structure have placed a strain on the Federal Republic's ability to use its 
economic strength as a policy instrument. 
The thesis concludes that Professor Schwarz may have underestimated 
Germany's capacity and resolve to define and defend its national interests. 
Germany does have concrete national interests which are defended by German 
politicians. However, those interests are purposely limited due to significant 
domestic and external constraints.   Germany's pursuit of a more assertive role 
Xll 
      
 
n   
  
 ru
   
 II
l
might not be in its own interests and could even be to its detriment. Germany's 
declared security interests may seem limited for a country of such geopolitical 
importance and size, but they are consistent with West Germany's post-1949 
policies and have been accepted by the German people as a whole since 
reunification in 1990. 
However, one should not conclude that Germany neglects power politics as 
Schwarz has contended in his writings. Germans are well aware of power factors 
in international politics and successfully deal with them within acceptable 
boundaries. The realm of the Federal Republic's contemporary Machtpolitik may 
be summed up in three points: appealing to the public's sense of responsibility to 
further political goals, implementing "assertive" diplomatic and economic measures 
on occasion, and supporting the right of others to use military force. 
In addition, Schwarz overlooks three important explanations of why Germans 
appear to shun power politics. First, many Germans are satisfied with their 
comfortable lives and have no desire to pursue what could be viewed as risky 
"experiments." Germans also tend to exhibit an attitude of moral aloofness and 
loathe the idea of warfighting. As a result, "checkbook" diplomacy has become the 
norm for pursuing political objectives. Secondly, German citizens have become 
reluctant to accept an enlarged foreign policy role in light of the tumultuous 
economic and societal problems associated with reunification and the costly social 
welfare system. Finally, Germany has been able to successfully avoid many power 
politics dilemmas by "free-riding" off American and allied military protection. As 
one German student recently said to Rand Corporation researchers, "War - that is 
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I. MACHTBESESSENHEIT TO MACHTVERGESSENHEIT: HANS-PETER 
SCHWARZ'S THESIS THAT GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH IS 
INAPPROPRIATE FOR TODAY'S WORLD 
During the period from the end of the Second World War until reunification in 
1990, most West Germans believed that pursuing a foreign and security policy in the form 
of a Bismarckian MaclxcpoMk (power policy) ran contrary to Germany's interests; and this 
approach was even considered unconstitutional by others. A power-political approach 
would have caused anxiety among Germany's neighbors, thereby creating instability in 
Europe. One of Germany's most distinguished historians and theorists on international 
relations, Hans-Peter Schwarz of Bonn University, contended that the Federal Republic 
of Germany transformed Germany's international policy approach from one of 
Machtpolitik (power policy) to Verantwortungspolitik (responsibility policy) and 
Moralpolitik (morality policy). This led, Schwarz argued, to West Germany taking an 
emphatically "responsible and moral" approach to its foreign and security policies and to 
a neglect or forgetting {Machtvergessenheit) of power considerations in international 
security affairs. The central purpose of this thesis is to analyze the factors of continuity 
and change regarding Schwarz's assessments regarding German Machtvergessenheit, both 
before and since German reunification in 1990. 
This introduction reviews Schwarz's answers to two important questions. First, 
what motivates the Germans to lean more towards "moral" policy, an approach that 
emphasizes supranational or multilateral community interests over national interests? 
Second, will Germans continue to deem a "moral" policy appropriate or will they decide 
that Germany should pursue a more aggressive security policy? The economic and 
domestic constraints that influence German foreign policy and the actual foreign policy 
choices currently being pursued by Bonn's politicians are broader topics and are addressed 
in later chapters of this thesis. 
At this juncture, it is important to define "power politics" or a "power policy" since 
the term has various meanings and is an essential term in this thesis. Professor Schwarz 
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...a system between states, typified by the following types of behavior: 
arms races, use of economic and diplomatic pressures, regional or global 
forms of imperialism, alliances, opposing alliances and counter-balancing 
of power, isolationist and neutral politics and war. In such a system, the 
role of rights and morality is restricted, and the position of individual 
groups within the realm of international hierarchy depends in the final 
analysis upon its worth within the scheme of potential or actual conflicts.1 
In 1985, Schwarz argued that the Federal Republic of Germany must proceed with 
a "dual strategy" course in its foreign policy in order to be an effective leader in the new 
international order. Germany should, he suggested, seek a rational middle ground in its 
foreign policy. This strategy is one that incorporates a proper aspiration for peace and 
an instinct for power; the aim is to further one's own interests and, at the same time, to 
respect the interests of others. Schwarz recommends a moderate approach to power factors 
in international politics - verantwortliche Machtpolitik (responsible power politics) - and 
rejects an extremist and egotistical approach, such as pursued by the Nazis. Schwarz 
defines responsible power politics as an approach " whereby a state guarantees its own 
independence and survival in the middle of European tensions and in a shaky world order 
but also prevents the breakdown of the fragile world order. "2 Since German reunification, 
the German government has taken steps to make Germany a more "normal" country, one 
that has broken out of its status as a "political dwarf".3 However, it remains to be seen 
how far Germany's normalization will proceed in the future. 
By examining some key foreign policy events since German reunification in 1990, 
one can analyze to what extent Germany is pursuing its own interests or "moving in 
convoy". The events that are examined in this thesis include Germany's ambivalent 
political orientation in the volatile Balkan region, Germany's ongoing dilemma on how to 
best incorporate the ideals of moral and responsible policy in its foreign policy, and the 
Federal Republic's emphatic desire to seek a more cohesive European Union when Europe 
seems to be leaning - at least in some ways - towards disintegration. In the final analysis, 
this thesis concludes, as Schwarz points out in his works, that Germany needs to consider 
its own national interests in its foreign policy decision making because its current approach 
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2 
is unlikely to satisfy emerging and future requirements. Germany must face the realities 
around it and understand that it is part of a continent where other countries are becoming 
more focused on their own national interests. 
With the end of the Cold War, many European politicians assume that nations no 
longer need to unite and pursue multilateral political courses in order to solve their 
problems.4 Therefore, depending on the approaches taken by Germany's European Union 
partners, it may become even more important for German decision-makers to consider 
national interests "foremost" concerning defense and security issues instead of giving the 
European Union a higher priority. In other words, the Federal Republic may need to alter 
its Cold War political practices in order to make them more compatible with the demands 
of the times. Germany needs to revise its policies before it is shocked into the realization 
that it could become a victim of "collateral damage" or political blackmail resulting from 
strife in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Russia, or regions just beyond Europe's territorial 
borders.5 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF MACHTVERGESSENHEIT (FORGETTING OF 
POWER POLITICS) 
It is important to first understand why Germans spurn power politics because it 
directly affects the way German politicians conduct foreign policy today. The term 
'nationalism' causes many Germans to squirm, especially when it is used in the context of 
security issues. Americans expect their politicians to consider national interests in security 
policy decision-making. Americans tend to glorify certain events as necessary measures 
for the survival and expansion of their nation (for instance, the Mexican War and the 
Spanish-American War). 
The opposite case holds true for Germans. As Hans-Peter Schwarz puts it, left of 
center and mainstream Germans shun nationalism like born-again Christians shun sinners.6 
Nationalism is a negative word for Germans and conjures up memories of the Kaiser, 
spiked helmets, World War I, and Hitler. On the other hand, humanitarian missions are 
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3 
deployments abroad since the Second World War have taken place only since the end of 
the Cold War and have mainly been conducted within the context of humanitarian missions 
(Kampuchea, Somalia, and Iraq). 
After 1945, West Germans avoided foreign policy approaches that seemed 
nationalistic out of fear that they might jeopardize their standing in the free world as 
citizens solidly committed to the policies of Western Europe and the United States. West 
Germany had its first supposed "missed opportunity" of placing its own national interests 
over the interests of the West in 1952, when Stalin proposed a reunification of both 
Germanies for the price of neutrality.7 The SPD supported the idea of reunification for 
neutrality. Instead, Adenauer opted to remain in the Western Alliance, choosing freedom 
with the West and pursuing unification on Western terms. 
Another factor contributing to the emergence of Machtvergessenheit after the 
Second World War was the acceptance of idealistic philosophies within the main political 
parties in Germany. These parties included the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and two 
smaller ones (the Free Democrats and the Greens). These center-left to left-wing parties 
have consistently maintained that the pursuit of national interests can only bring negative 
consequences upon the German nation and have shunned the principle of pursuing national 
interests and especially the use of force to achieve that end. Hence, ideals of "universal 
human rights", Weltinnenpolitik (world domestic politics), global ecology, world peace, 
morality, and self-determination have been embraced by these parties. These principles 
have also been popularized in German political culture by way of the mass media, 
politicians, and teachers.8 
Political parties in Germany are split over the meaning of morality. Some factions 
tend to link moralism with religious connotations. Morality consciously associates deeds 
with ethical principles. On the other hand, conservatives tend to view moralism in a 
secular manner whereby a nation conducts its business with the awareness that it takes full 
responsibility for its actions.9 Although German politicians may have shunned power 
politics, that does not necessarily mean that the German people are oblivious to it. 
Election results suggest that German citizens tend to lean toward the more conservative 
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4 
view of morality, a circumstance which offers support for the assessment that Germany 
may one day reassert itself as a normal state. Many have questioned the SPD's ability to 
govern (i.e., whether it is Regierungsfähig).10 For this reason and others, the 
conservatives have been in power for most of the Federal Republic of Germany's post- 
1949 political existence. 
In the 1970's, feelings of helplessness seemed to prey on the West Germans. It 
was a tumultuous time to say the least. After two decades of economic boom, known 
today as the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), the Federal Republic's economy 
suffered a recession. The problems of an expensive social market economy started to take 
their toll. In addition, the oil embargo forced the Germans to recognize their 
vulnerabilities and the obstacles to securing reliable energy sources for their export- 
dependent economy. In addition, terrorism threatened to paralyze the nation's psyche.11 
Groups like the Bader Meinhof gang and the Red Army Faction forced the central 
government to wage an active campaign against them or risk losing legitimacy in the eyes 
of its constituents. The war in Vietnam made matters worse. The United States was now 
looked upon with disappointment and suspicion. West Germans started to question 
whether they were allied with a trustworthy "big brother" or with the better of two evils 
(the Soviets being the other evil). 
Another important point about West Germany's acceptance of European integration 
and a moralistic approach to politics was the "appealing" nature of such ideas. Since 
nationalism had not worked in Gennany in the past, another approach needed to be 
adopted. An uncomfortable historical characteristic of German political culture has been 
a tendency to embrace extremist attitudes, whether from the left or the right. Perhaps that 
helps to explain the West German swing from Machtpolitik to Moralpolitik, and the 
adoption of the goals of peace and morality over notions such as nationalism and 
militarism. Ideally, a "normal" nation should consider a proper mix of the two extremes 
and seek a middle ground, but West Germany found it difficult to do so.12 By the 1970's, 
all major parties in West Germany had agreed that furthering a united Europe and 




















West Germans hoped, would expunge Europe of nationalistic notions and all the bad 
connotations that came with them (alliances, suspicions, isolationism). West Germany 
wanted to be the catalyst that would propel other European nations to accept the same 
selfless and moralistic ideals that it had adopted. As a result, West Germany actively 
pursued European integration more than other countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Denmark. 
Seeking a united Europe has transfixed the Germans to the point that there is truth 
to Chancellor Kohl's argument that once an integration measure has been taken, there is 
no going back on it. Any such turning back would have a shocking impact on the 
Germans. Uniting Europe has been an ingrained political goal for over two generations, 
and it is a goal that cannot be easily forgotten or ignored.13 
Finally, West Germany put a lot of faith in its allegiance to the United States and 
NATO during the Cold War. For West Germany, the idea of maintaining sovereignty 
without the United States meant the increased likelihood of subjugation by the Soviets. 
As a result, West Germany was often willing to accept the decisions of the United States 
and its allies. The Federal Republic sobered up quickly to the prospects of Soviet tyranny 
after facing the blockade of Berlin, becoming a target of Soviet political aggression and 
espionage, and observing the construction of a fortified wall along its eastern border. 
Whereas other countries could easily place conditions on United States policies like 
insisting that no maneuver forces be placed on national soil during peacetime (Norway, 
Denmark) or going so far as to pull out of the integrated military structure of NATO 
(Spain and France), West Germany could do no such thing. 
Because of the nation's division and continuing Four Power rights, West Germany 
had fewer rights to self-determination than did the other Western European nations. In 
addition, West Germany did not want to jeopardize its American ties by taking decisions 
that could offend its powerful ally. Doing so could have resulted in a decreased European 
commitment by the United States and an increased likelihood of political blackmail by the 
Soviet Union. The political power situation during the Cold War essentially resulted in 
a zero-sum situation for West Germany: either side with one superpower (the United 
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States) or become a subject of another one (the Soviet Union). Even though the Soviets 
were considered enemies of democracy, there were still calls in the 1960's and 1970's by 
the more liberal leaders in the United States Congress, Senator Mansfield for example, for 
a U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe.14 Therefore, West Germany was always unsure of 
how far it could go in flexing its political muscle. 
B. POST-REUNIFICATION: WILL GERMANY BREAK OUT OF 
MACHTVERGESSENHEIT? 
After its reunification, questions were raised about the future of Germany's foreign 
policy. Now that it was a fully sovereign state, would the Federal Republic change its 
political course and pursue a more assertive security policy? Would it seek an eastern 
orientation or a neutral course? 
The success of reunification was attributed to the Federal Republic's steady course 
of Western alignment, total adherence to democratic values, firm emphasis on greater 
European integration, and disregard for nationalistic power politics. For the first time in 
Germany's history, three generations had lived in economic prosperity devoid of wars. 
As a result, the Germans saw no need, upon reunification, to make any radical changes 
in the Federal Republic's policies and principles, ones that had worked so well over the 
course of the Cold War.15 Unfortunately, Schwarz argues, Germany failed to realize that 
its optimistic political attitudes were no longer applicable in the post-Cold War political 
world. An example of this solidification of idealistic principles, in spite of the changing 
political world, appeared in a speech given by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
in March 1990, shortly before Germany's unification: 
The destiny of the German nation is inextricably linked to Europe's 
destiny.... [quoting Thomas Mann] We do not want a German Europe, but 
a European Germany....The policy pursued by the Federal Republic of 
Germany ever since its inception has.. .been a policy of responsibility. It 
is the rejection of past power politics.16 
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German politicians believed that the Federal Republic could continue its "moral and 
responsible" course in international politics after October 1990. If "moral" policies and 
the ideals of democracy and self-determination worked for Germany, they should work for 
everyone else as well. However, Germany soon realized that it could not always rely on 
idealistic principles in order to solve Europe's foreign policy dilemmas, let alone its own.1 
C. YUGOSLAVIA: A CONFLICT IN GERMAN PRINCIPLES 
Germany's support for the principle of self-determination (the rights of people to 
choose their own destiny) was based on its acceptance of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Wir 
sind ein Volk was the German rallying cry in calling for a quick reunification of both 
Germanies in 1989-1990, despite some hesitation and signs of opposition in the Soviet 
Union, France, and the United Kingdom. The two states represented an unnatural 
separation of the Gentian people, and the fusion of the two German halves was inevitable 
after the March 1990 elections in East Germany. Later, Germany decided to apply the 
same principle of self-determination to the Yugoslav breakaway states as well. Germany 
believed that the Croatians and Slovenians had the same right to establish their own 
sovereign nation-state, free of Serbian subjugation. Germany felt so strongly about 
recognizing these Balkan states that it politically muscled its way to achieve that goal even 
at the expense of annoying some of its partners in NATO and the European Community. 
German politicians contended that advocating "moral principles" over the evils of power 
politics was the correct policy course to pursue, even if it meant going against the wishes 
of Germany's political partners.18 
However, the Federal Republic quickly realized that it had made a major foreign 
policy blunder. Today, Germany is blamed by many observers as partly responsible for 
the situation in the Balkans and reproached for being politically naive in thinking that 
recognition of the former Yugoslav states would bring peace to the region. Pursuing self- 
determination can involve ugly consequences, as demonstrated by the fighting in Russia 
and the former Yugoslav federation. In addition, German self-determination is still looked 
upon with suspicion by many in neighboring countries, who wonder whether the Federal 
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Republic will support property claims to accommodate expelled Germans living since 1945 
in Germany and champion the rights of German minorities abroad. Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel has indicated that he still considers the Sudeten question open, although the 
Czech government wants the issue to be a closed matter.19 Although such suspicions have 
largely subsided, they were a major issue in 1990 when Germany was seeking reunification 
against the wishes of some Europeans. 
Could Germany recognize an autonomous Kurdish region at the political and 
territorial expense of Turkey, its fellow NATO partner? Could Germany recognize the 
right of self-determination for Albanians in Kosovo, even though it might result in further 
violence in the region? Such questions have obliged Germans to realize that the principle 
of self-determination cannot be used in all situations and can conflict with other desirable 
goals, such as stability and peace.20 
The second reason for Germany's diplomatic "miscalculations" in the Balkan region 
dates further back than the recent past. It results from a culmination of decades of what 
Schwarz calls "simplistic and optimistic moral political principles" which have been 
ingrained in the German people. In the churches, schools, social clubs, mass media, and 
bars, Germans developed a keen awareness of global issues but always talked about them 
rather than taking action. The German phrase "Gedankenschwer und tatenarm" may be 
interpreted to mean "bystanders with a heavy conscience" and is analogous to the 
American term "armchair quarterback." This phrase is used by Schwarz to describe 
Germany's current political culture.21 
Finally, Schwarz argues, the German diplomatic failures in the former Yugoslavia 
resulted from "deficiencies" in German politics. According to Schwarz, one of the 
shortcomings in the West German version of democracy after 1949 was the extinction of 
any analysis of strategic interests and power politics in foreign policy. As a result, 
Germany failed to establish and formally announce its real strategic and vital interests upon 
reunification. Why then should Germany have gotten involved in the Balkans if it had not 
taken the first step of defining its own external strategic interests? 
























is practically "paralyzed" when it comes to executing legitimate foreign policy decisions. 
The SPD opposition party and even Kohl's coalition partner, the Free Democrats, have 
repeatedly criticized Kohl's actions involving the deployment of the Bundeswehr in "out 
of area" missions. These two parties went so far as to take the government to the 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruehe in order to demand a ruling on the legality of the use 
of Bundeswehr troops outside the confines of Germany. According to Schwarz's analysis, 
this is not a unique circumstance and tossing a delicate foreign policy question from the 
executive and legislative bodies to the judicial system is characteristic of German foreign 
and security policy practices. As a result, Schwarz contends, Germany is being "laughed" 
at by the free world. The German government hastily recognized the breakaway Yugoslav 
republics, even though this move was contested by the United States and by Germany's 
partners in the European Community, now the European Union. Yet, the federal 
government could not muster enough political support to participate in the protection of 
those new states that it had so strongly supported.22 
D. EUROPEAN DISINTEGRATION: UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE 
INEVITABLE 
With its reunification in 1990, Germany realized that its new stature caused anxiety 
among its European neighbors, including some high-level politicians in France and the 
United Kingdom. Germany realized that by continuing its long-standing support for an 
integrated European Union, it would alleviate those fears. Even though Germany could 
obviously flex more political muscle because of its unification, the Federal Republic 
willingly placed limits on its own political power.23 The Bundeswehr is smaller than the 
size that was agreed upon in the "Two plus Four" Agreement and will probably remain 
small for years to come, owing to budgetary constraints. Germany has had no experience 
in unilateral security or economic arrangements since 1945, and German elites have seen 
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However, Schwarz suggests, Germany's desire for a European political and 
economic union is becoming an unrealistic goal. It is a goal that could result in other 
countries taking advantage of the Federal Republic in order to fulfill their own national 
interests. The idea that European integration could proceed to some future political union 
is becoming ever more remote. The precursor for times to come was the breakdown of 
the European exchange rate mechanism in 1992. Future attempts at reviving this system 
will probably meet considerable opposition. The citizens of Denmark initially rejected the 
Maastricht treaty on European Union, and only after concessions were granted, did they 
accept the treaty's conditions.24 Most recently, the situation in Bosnia and Norway's 
rejection of European Union membership have dampened the spirits of those advocating 
stronger economic and security integration in Europe. European Union negotiations in 
1996 could therefore prove to be politically difficult. 
Even if the European Union was to become more integrated, Germany would still 
have to contend with countries trying to pursue their own interests in order to further their 
political agendas within the framework of an integrated union. For example, France wants 
to develop a European security and defense identity with greater autonomy from the 
United States, whereas the United Kingdom still favors a security system based on close 
ties across the Atlantic Ocean. Unfortunately. Germany is discovering that amiable 
solutions are difficult to come by, even with its closest allies. Often solutions result in a 
zero-sum situation, whereby when the Federal Republic compromises by siding with one 
country, it finds itself at odds with another state.25 For Germany, much of this zero-sum 
situation is familiar from the Cold War years, except that this time, the West European 
states are not obliged to cooperate out of fear of the Soviet Union. 
Another dilemma facing Germany is the idea of the "widening" and "deepening" 
of NATO and the European Union. Germany is quickly realizing that one cannot do both 
at the same time. Widening inextricably carries a risk of losing cohesiveness. Widening 
means accepting more member states, each bringing its own particular cultural, social, and 
political orientations and agendas. How can one satisfy the individual states and ensure 











developing crisis in the European Union, Wolfgang Schaeuble, head of the CDU 
parliamentary group in the Bundestag, proposed a "core" group of integrated states, 
whereby countries that are ready to seek greater unity could proceed at a faster pace than 
others. The other members would remain in a peripheral status until they were willing to 
accept the terms for closer integration. However, the countries that would make up the 
periphery, such as Spain, have shown no interest in such an arrangement. Even within 
Kohl's ruling coalition, there are doubts about such a plan, with Klaus Kinkel, Germany's 
foreign minister, leading the opposition.27 
E. CONCLUSION: POWER POLITICS, THE SOBERING REALITY OF THE 
PRESENT 
Numerous other factors are forcing German security elites to recognize that 
idealistic policy principles cannot provide satisfactory guidelines for all the challenges 
ahead. Germany continues to depend on the United States for conventional and nuclear 
force protection in order to neutralize risks from a possible Russian resurgence. Schwarz 
contends that United States involvement is "essential" to solving the problems in the 
Balkans.28 The likelihood that an integrated European security institution would be 
effective seems remote in light of political developments that have occurred since 1989. 
The Western European Union has yet to establish itself as a viable military organization, 
and the setbacks at the December 1994 CSCE/OSCE conference in Budapest are proof 
that a consensus on European security requirements is unlikely, at least for the foreseeable 
future. A European collective security arrangement, without opposing alliances, is 
philosophically attractive to many Germans; but the reality is that NATO's collective 
defense arrangement provides Germany with more security than any practical alternative. 
As a result of its mounting reunification costs, Germany's long-standing reliance 
on "checkbook diplomacy" is a luxury policy course that it can no longer afford. Almost 
one-third of the government's annual budget is allocated to programs designed to 
economically revitalize the five eastern Länder. Germany is now a member of the league 
of deficit nations.   Gone are the days when it could solve an international problem with 
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the D-mark. 
Germany is thus forced to make difficult decisions, such as either supporting the 
southern tier of Europe against Islamic fundamentalism or providing economic impetus to 
the new democracies in the Visegrad states. These difficult "either...or" decisions are 
proving to be unpopular with some of Germany's citizens and allies. The Federal 
Republic can ill afford to transfer resources to the southern regions of Europe as it once 
did; and, at the same time, it is expected to play a central role in efforts to revitalize 
Eastern Europe. For Germany, these demands are alarming, because its past foreign 
policy choices placed an over-emphasis on economic solutions. Germany is a country 
where the use of military force is not an acceptable option, except in extreme 
circumstances; and yet economic remedies are becoming ever more costly. 
Some Germans realize that their nation must increasingly pursue a responsible, yet 
power-oriented diplomacy. This type of diplomacy will at least ensure that the limited 
funds available for foreign development will be spent in areas that further Germany's most 
important interests. There is simply not enough money in the Bundesbank to solve all of 
Europe's problems. Failure to adopt a reasonable power-political approach in foreign 
policy will severely limit Germany's ability to protect its most vital security interests, 
which are increasingly challenged by irrational forces. Such forces (including some of the 
belligerents in the former Yugoslavia) seem increasingly immune to diplomatic and 
economic pressures. Negotiations with these forces, in their present form, are proving to 
be virtually futile.29 
In summation, Schwarz argues that Germany must understand that "despite all 
efforts to act in concert, the governments of the major powers [and smaller ones as well] 
will continue to act independently on occasion, either openly or in secret." As a result, 
Schwarz concludes, Germans are fooling themselves by believing that they can continue 
to neglect Germany's national interests and follow idealistic policy principles that stress 
morality, multilateralism, and integration.30 This last point leads to the central questions 
to be examined in this thesis: what are the foreign policy approaches being pursued by 
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has national interests? Does their strategy appear to fulfill Germany's interests? The latter 
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H.  GERMANY'S INTERESTS: SHAPING A STABLE WORLD ORDER 
Since the end of the Cold War, the issue of Germany's security interests has taken 
center stage in European security politics. Germany's security goals and the approaches 
that Germany has taken to fulfill those goals have evoked controversy. 
Some scholars and leaders (including President Mitterrand and then-Prime Minister 
Thatcher) believed at the time of reunification that Germany would pursue an assertive 
foreign policy, with goals that it deemed in its best interests. Concerns about a reunited 
Germany - addressed further in part D, chapter m - were based in part on what were 
perceived to be unique cultural and historical characteristics of the German people. Those 
characteristics, which many thought would help to shape German politics, included 
tendencies of "overdoing things, aggressiveness, egotism, and complexes of inferiority and 
self-pity." They further believed that institutions such as the EU and NATO should be 
maintained in order to contain German power and prevent a Fourth German Reich.1 
On the other hand, others perceived Germany's security interests in a different way 
by looking deeper into the character of the post-1945 German political culture. Many 
Germans, especially those that remember the Second World War, continue to assert that 
Germany's interests can only be furthered within the context of a united Europe. Only 
through a stable Europe, these Germans suggest, can Germany hope to achieve lasting 
prosperity and peace. From this German perspective, notions of nationalism and power 
politics are considered irrelevant when describing contemporary German policies. In the 
view of many Germans, the aggressive and nationalistic pursuit of power politics would 
weaken Germany's position as a legitimate political power and damage the Federal 
Republic's reputation, one that it has so painstakingly built since 1949. 
This chapter analyzes to what extent power political considerations actually drive 
contemporary German security politics and to what extent a united Europe - one that could 
play a role in stabilizing international security relationships - is the goal in forming 
German policy decisions. The controversy is analyzed by examining the foreign policy 
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Once German national interests are identified, the subsequent sections analyze the 
political strategy that Germany has taken to pursue its interests. These strategic pathways 
include: continuing the "special" relationship with the United States (a term formally 
applied to the United States-United Kingdom relationship), maintaining its membership in 
NATO, pursuing a new approach regarding the Franco-German relationship, establishing 
a buffer zone (cordon sanitaire) of protection along its eastern border, and achieving a 
position as a world decision maker.2 
A. GERMAN POLITICS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS 
German politicians tend to believe that openly championing national interests has 
no future in German politics and actually fear the consequences of pursuing such a route. 
Many Germans (as well as many Europeans) believe that nationalism and the aggressive 
pursuit of national interests drove Germany into two world wars. These historical 
tragedies serve as reminders of what could happen to Germany if it were to seek a solo 
foreign policy course in the post-Cold War era. Germans also feel a sense of 
responsibility towards their neighbors and readily accept the obligation that they 'never 
again' pursue policies that could evoke Angst among their fellow Europeans, including the 
Russians. As a result, Moralpolitik and Veranrwortungspolitik (policies of morality and 
responsibility) have been adopted as the most acceptable policy approaches by the post- 
1945 German governments.3 The acceptance of these approaches has made it difficult for 
Germany to steer any other course, let alone a more assertive one. 
However, it is difficult for Germany to keep acting like a "political dwarf" when 
its stature in the political world has grown. Excluding Russia, Germany is the most 
populous of the European countries, with 80.3 million people. Additionally, Germany is 
the dominant economic power in Europe. For example, the annual value of its exports 
exceeds 420 billion dollars, which roughly equals the combined export amount of both 
France and the United Kingdom.4 Germany holds a key geopolitical-political position in 
Europe and is considered the "linchpin" for European stability and economic progress. 
Its location provides the gateway from Western Europe to the Visegrad countries, the 
18 
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Balkans, and the Nordic states. Chancellor Kohl understands his country's new status. 
He does not espouse the idea of power politics in a Hobbesian or Machiavellian sense but 
does believe that Germany has a right and duty to assume the obligations of a "normal" 
sovereign state. 
In contrast with the situation during the Cold War, the Federal Republic's politics 
no longer reflect the situation that existed when the nation was divided in half by a 
fortified wall and West Germany had a large allied protector force stationed on its soil. 
Since the crumbling of the Wall, the Federal Republic feels more exposed to new types 
of security threats and risks. This has increased the determination of German politicians 
to ensure that peace is maintained on the European continent. Germany seems intent on 
using its new status as a "normal" state (that is, since reunification) to encourage 
neighboring countries to be constructive participants in a peaceful and stable world order. 
The Germans are still interested in avoiding unilateral decision-making, as they were 
during the Cold War, and want to "move in convoy" (sometimes in the lead and sometimes 
not). This idea of pursuing multilateral courses was illustrated by Germany's staunch 
support of NATO decisions during the Cold War and more recently by its deployment of 
Bundeswehr troops to Somalia. 
According to German leaders, involving nations in multilateral international 
organizations would ultimately contribute to a more stable world order. Having peace in 
Europe means security for Germany. This could lead one to believe that Germany is 
actually pursuing its own interests as well as what Germans perceive to be the general 
interests of all of Europe. However, German interests seem to be obscured by the 
emphasis on what is called "moral" and "responsible" politics. Germany's strategy seems 
intent on expanding the membership of international institutions such as NATO and the EU 
in order to establish a "widening" zone of peace, prosperity, and stability, one that is 
favorable to Germany. However, the idea of "deepening" the integration of Europe may 
not be as important as one might think, especially when there are overriding national 














economic efforts to Eastern Europe. (The shift in priorities implies deemphasizing 
economic revitalization in southern Europe.) 
German politicians have also mastered the art of appealing to feelings of historical 
responsibility and morality to further Germany's interests. For example, Defense Minister 
Volker Ruehe and President Roman Herzog have both made statements calling for the 
eastern expansion of NATO as a way to make up for past German wrong-doing during the 
period 1939-1945. In a recent call for Polish membership into NATO, Ruehe stated: 
After all the suffering inflicted on the Polish people by German soldiers 
50 years ago. it is of special importance for the reconciliation of our 
peoples that German and Polish troops are working so closely [on such] 
friendly [terms] together today.5 
This particular method of atoning for the past and at the same time pursuing today's 
national priorities, albeit in a subtle manner, successfully pushes forward Germany's 
agenda and stymies opposition from the more pacifistic elements in German society. 
B.  GERMAN SECURITY INTERESTS 
Before proceeding further, it is important to understand what makes up German 
security interests. For the first time in its history, Germany is currently in an enviable 
position of having friendly countries on all of its borders. France cooperates so closely 
with Germany that their partnership is sometimes referred to as the Franco-German axis. 
According to Josef Joffe. Russia and Germany are now separated by about 1000 miles 
(excluding Kaliningrad and the Russian forces in Belarus), and the current relationship 
between the two countries seems non-threatening. The United States, sometimes described 
as the world's only superpower, is solidly aligned with the Western Europeans. Finally, 
because of its economic might, Germany is considered the economic "engine" that can best 
drive future prosperity in Europe. Instead of people wanting to leave Germany, the 
current problem is how to prevent unwanted immigrants from coming into the country. 
As a result, Germany's security interests directly relate to the challenge of balancing this 
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Complex issues force Germany to take a number of potentially conflicting political 
pathways. Germany wants to work with France in order to build a framework for greater 
European integration. However, the French approach to European integration does not 
always "harmonise" well with the Atlantic connection, one that Germany depends on and 
clearly values. Moreover, balancing politics among the individual eastern states is 
difficult, especially in view of the economic and political disparities between Germany and 
those states. Finally, Germany is caught in a "Catch-22" situation. It is expected and 
required to become a "civilian power", one that makes decisions which promote 
international peace. However, Germany must also be careful not to become too 
"assertive", because this could fuel Angst among smaller countries.7 The domestic and 
economic constraints that affect Germany's alleged "assertiveness" in foreign policy are 
further analyzed in the next chapter. 
As a result, Germany's interests can be summed up as follows: ensuring that 
friendly relations are maintained with all countries that could harm its security, 
establishing economic and political stability in Europe, maintaining a strong alliance and 
national force posture capable of handling threats to its sovereignty and able to contribute 
to the defense of Western Europe as a whole, and stemming the flood of migration 
entering Western Europe.8 The remaining sections of this chapter analyze Germany's 
approach to each of these issues. 
C.  REDEFINING THE GERMAN FRENCH RELATIONSHIP 
After 1949, German-French relations evolved into what is known as the French- 
German axis. France and West Germany needed each other in order to further their own 
interests. France owned the comparative advantage in political leadership and 
assertiveness. By the mid-1960's, Germany held the edge in economic strength. Growing 
cooperation with West Germany was also a way for the French to channel their frustrations 
away from the troubles that they had suffered overseas. France also saw an opportunity 
to increase its influence in Europe and viewed Germany as a mechanism to attain political 









n reduced its ability to become a politically assertive country, but West Germans viewed 
the French connection as a way of legitimately asserting the Federal Republic's potential 
as an economic power.9 
For a number of reasons, the other NATO countries did not view this growing 
relationship with alarm. The United States served as a counterweight against any 
significant ambitions that these two countries may have wanted to pursue. The integration 
of Europe during the Cold War had proceeded at a slow pace, and the other Western 
European countries were satisfied with the Paris-Bonn leadership arrangement since they 
were reaping the benefits of an economically strong Germany. 
However, the situation changed with the demise of the Cold War and the 
reunification of Germany. With its newly acquired sovereignty, the Federal Republic 
gained more flexibility in developing and pursuing its own security policies. In addition, 
German politicians viewed international institutions such as NATO and the EU as tools 
that Germany could use to further its own interests and goals.10 The issue now is not so 
much where policy decisions are made as whether such decisions can be formulated within 
the context of a supranational organization subject to significant German influence. 
German political influence may then extend across the face of Europe. 
There is a growing tendency in Germany to redefine the relationship with France. 
Germany seems reluctant to subordinate itself to the French. Relations started to sour in 
1989 when President Mitterrand seemed at some moments inclined to oppose German 
reunification. It was not due to pure chance that Mitterrand met with Gorbachev only 
eight days after Chancellor Kohl presented his reunification plan to the Russian leader. 
Mitterrand's intent was apparently to have Gorbachev stop the reunification process or at 
least slow it down. As the European Union "widens and deepens", France's ability to 
exert its influence becomes weaker. And, as Germany redefines its interests, it becomes 
less receptive to French security initiatives. 
First, the countries have conflicting views on how the Central European states 
should be integrated into the European Union. Mitterrand wants to take a slower approach 















become members of the EU. This hesitation, on behalf of the French, stems from a 
combination of their own economic and political dilemmas and from a desire by Mitterrand 
to exact his own terms for a confederated approach. Germany, on the other hand, is 
advocating a quicker resolution to the economic quandary and political vacuum that exist 
in the eastern states, even at the expense of a shallower deepening of integration.11 
Germany has more at stake in that region than France, especially when it comes to 
security and migration issues. On the other hand, France is more concerned about 
Germany lessening its long-time support of the southern European states. This would 
almost certainly place a greater burden on the French.  According to Jacob Heilbrunn: 
...the EU has presided over a substantial transfer of wealth from the North 
to the South. Germany has contributed two-thirds of the entire net transfer 
totalling DM 133 billion. Given the costs of putting Eastern Germany back 
on its feet, the Germans have little enthusiasm for further massive EU 
outlays, and German ire in this respect is particularly directed at France. 
Germany now wants to direct financial resources away from the South and towards its 
eastern borders, an area more important to Germany's security interests.12 Regional 
interests are also diverging for both countries, with Germany focusing more on Russia and 
France becoming more preoccupied with North Africa. Another growing rift between the 
two countries concerns the issue of a common European currency. France wanted 
governmental control over the European bank, on the model of the French state's control 
over the Banque de France. However, Germany insisted on a financial institution that was 
independent of governmental control similar to the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve 
in the United States. Much to the chagrin of the French, the Germans not only succeeded 
in their bid to have an independently run EU financial institution, but they also succeeded 
in moving the financial seat of the EU to Frankfurt, the home of the Bundesbank. In 
addition, the Deutschmark was used as the monetary standard for the European currency 
unit (ECU), a situation which forced member states to tie their currencies with the value 
of the D-mark.13 This particular plan has since failed, but it will be reevaluated in a few 
years. 
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Finally, on the issue of defense, Germany will no longer tolerate being "tied down" 
while France does whatever it desires. Many of the French want to weaken the 
importance of the Atlantic Alliance and take a more "Fortress Europe" approach towards 
integrating Europe.14 However, this poses a dilemma for Germany. It is in Germany's 
best interests to avoid an "exclusively European" or an independently "bilateral" U.S.- 
German relationship. Germany finds it imperative for Europe and the United States to 
work together.15 Germany considers both France and the United States vital to the 
integrated defense of Europe. So when France threatened to totally withdraw its troops 
from Germany shortly after reunification, Chancellor Kohl worked with President 
Mitterrand to develop the proposal for the formation of a European Corps. The German 
motivation behind this new organization was to tie the French into a more cohesive 
European security strategy. This initially alarmed other NATO members, especially the 
United States. The Eurocorps was viewed as an attempt by France and Germany to 
disassociate themselves from the Atlantic Alliance, hence weakening NATO. However, 
Germany merely intended to draw the French into a closer relationship with NATO and 
prevent the French from pursuing a unilateral European security strategy. Secondly, 
Germany wanted to maintain a variety of allied troops stationed on its soil in order to ease 
apprehensions. Additionally, the Bonn government believed that having only U.S. and 
British soldiers stationed in the Federal Republic might be construed by some as a policy 
of an entrenched alignment with the more traditional Atlantic Alliance supporters. 
Germany soon realized that it needed to balance its commitments with France and 
NATO. Germany, without first consulting the French, supported the British proposal for 
NATO's ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. This offended Mitterrand because it showed that 
Germany was still continuing its long-time practice of trying to please everyone. 
Germany currently has three army corps. One of the corps is subordinated to the 
Eurocorps, one to the Rapid Reaction Corps, and one to its territorial defense forces. This 
last corps is stationed in Germany's eastern provinces. By subordinating the majority of 
its forces to NATO and the Eurocorps, Germany has succeeded in accomplishing what 
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it wanted to do: to tie the French into a closer alliance commitment and simultaneously to 
ensure that the United States remains a key ally in NATO.16 
D. ESTABLISHING SECURITY IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Germany's greatest security concerns lie along its eastern border. In order for 
stability to prevail in Europe, thereby enhancing Germany's security, the eastern states 
must be successfully integrated into the economic and security framework of Western 
Europe.17 The security challenges facing Central Europe alarm Germany. Threats that 
affect Germany from the East include the influx of refugees fleeing political turmoil and 
economic hardship. Moreover, Germany depends on Russia for strategic resources such 
as natural gas. Fears persist in Germany that additional conflicts could sprout in that 
region. This could result in "collateral damage" to Germany in the form of refugee 
migration, nuclear catastrophe, and ecological disasters. The Chernobyl disaster increased 
an already high level of anti-nuclear sentiment in the country. In addition, Germany is 
still facing a tremendous task of revitalizing its eastern region, which is an ecological and 
economic disaster zone. Similar economic and ecological problems persist in Central 
Europe and Russia. Finally, Germany is concerned about the political vacuum that exists 
in the region. Russia cannot be written off as a weak power. Germany knows that it is 
in its best interests to quickly establish some sort of long-term security and economic 
arrangement in central Europe in case a neo-nationalistic Russia emerges on the scene.18 
It is important to analyze the migration issue and its impact on German security. 
In 1992 alone, Germany received an influx of 400,000 refugees, which was the most for 
any European country. Not only was Germany forced to provide for these refugees, but 
it was simultaneously funding the withdrawal of the former Soviet Western Group of 
Forces stationed in its eastern states. The Russian troop withdrawal was directly related 
to the number of houses Germany built for the returning troops. Additionally, Germany 
continued to worry about the two million ethnic Germans living in Russia. If economic 





















fatherland.    This would severely tax the Federal Republic's already overburdened 
resources.19 
Germany's ability to help come up with a lasting solution to the problems in the 
East may directly affect the level of stability and prosperity in the German state. Of the 
refugees flowing into Western Europe from the Balkans, 300,000 of them settled in 
Germany. No other European country came close to harboring so many refugees. In 
contrast, Italy, the second leading nation to accept refugees from that region, took in only 
20,000 people.20 
The problems associated with migration are compounded by German xenophobia. 
The perception that foreigners destroy societal cohesion and orderliness helps fuel this fear 
of foreigners. German citizenship laws, unlike in the United States, are based on 
bloodlines. The country's Staatsbuergergesetz dates from 1913 and has been criticized as 
being unrealistic and racist. Second- and third-generation foreigners who have lived all 
their lives in Germany have fewer citizenship rights than a third- or fourth-generation 
Russian of German descent. Although the law has undergone several modifications since 
1913, it still penalizes foreigners that have assimilated themselves to German society. 
Second- and third- generation foreigners that have lived all their lives in Germany must 
still tackle a wall of red tape in order to change their citizenship. Even after the lengthy 
process, the applicant must prove in a court of law that he is Buergerfaehig, one who is 
worthy of German citizenship. As a result, most foreigners become discouraged and make 
no effort to change their citizenship. Others do not change it for fear of being ostracized 
by their own ethnic group and of being treated as outcasts in a racially homogenous 
German society. 
Secondly, Germans are emphatic about preserving law and order. Since the turn 
of the decade, the German people have expressed alarm about what they believe is a 
breakdown of civic order. This breakdown is perceived to be partly caused by the influx 
of refugees. Although the recent flood of refugees is small in comparison with the 
migration that followed after Germany's territorial losses in World War II, the current 
situation is not the same.   Most of the post-1945 refugees were easily absorbed into 
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German society because of their essentially German political and cultural background. 
However, the current generation of immigrants entering Germany present some complex 
problems that are difficult to resolve. Migration not only includes outsiders coming into 
Germany but eastern Germans moving to the more affluent western regions. These 
displaced people represent three distinct groups that are categorized as such: Ubersiedlers, 
Germans from the former GDR; Aussiedlers, Eastern Europeans and Russians of German 
descent; and asylum-seekers, refugees that have no ethnic ties to Germany but are seeking 
refuge from political persecution. From 1989 through 1991, the number of people 
entering or migrating within the Federal Republic from all three groups totalled in the 
millions. Prior to this period, less than 100,000 foreigners annually immigrated to the 
Federal Republic.21 
The ongoing foreigner issue has compounded problems in other areas of society as 
well as causing upheaval and Angst among Germans. Germany suffers from high 
unemployment. Even cities in the western half of Germany like Schweinfurt and 
Bremerhaven have suffered unemployment rates totaling some 15% of their work force. 
Affordable and decent housing is becoming scarce. More than a million additional units 
of living accommodations are still needed to house Germany's population. 
As a result, many frustrated Germans have vented their anger on foreigners, whom 
many perceive as being the root of Germany's economic and societal woes. In 1990, there 
were 270 reported attacks on foreigners in Germany. By 1992, that number exceeded 
2000.22 Some observers maintain that the government exacerbated the problem by housing 
refugees throughout the country. Prior to the start of the 1990's, the settlement of 
refugees was done in a manageable fashion, with relocations occurring in predominantly 
urban areas. However, as the decade progressed, the migration problem grew; and it soon 
became a serious domestic crisis. Refugees that were earlier situated in urban areas were 
now resettling in the more conservative rural sectors of Germany. As a result, attacks on 




















E.  SETTLING PROBLEMS IN THE EAST 
Germany has taken some steps designed to deal with the problems on its eastern 
border. These actions invariably further German interests. German politicians will not 
openly admit that the best approach to settling the eastern problems is to incorporate a 
responsible (if not hidden) level of "power politics" in their policies. Failure to 
incorporate the idea of "national interests" in these policies could, Hans-Peter Schwarz has 
argued, prove disastrous for Germany's security and could rekindle the dampened spirits 
of hardline German extremists.24 
The reason for the dismal support for the reactionaries in the October 1994 election 
was the ruling coalition's decision to adopt a firm approach in dealing with the refugee 
problem. Germany's stringent new asylum laws took the steam out of the extremists' anti- 
foreigner position.25 Another reason for seeking unilateral solutions to the migration 
problem is German frustration with the allies. The other members of the European Union 
have been slow to react to the problems in Central Europe and have left Germany to 
shoulder most of the burdens in the East. As a result, Germany has signed unilateral 
repatriation agreements with Eastern European countries in order to expedite the return of 
refugees back to their home countries. In the process. Croatians, Bulgarians, and Gypsies 
are currently being sent home.26 
Germany has also shown that it is capable of making assertive decisions against the 
wishes of its allies in order to further its own interests, which include supporting the right 
to self-determination, at least with respect to some nationalities. This was the case in 
December 1991, when the Federal Republic recognized Slovenia and Croatia. In another 
case, German fears of inflation propelled Germany to pursue an exceptionally eager 
approach to establishing a common European currency based on its own terms.27 
Germany's Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, has been the most outspoken advocate 
for extending NATO to the Visegrad countries. By "widening and deepening" 
international security institutions such as NATO, Germany seems intent on creating a 





















Germany's economic prowess in the region is growing as well. Aid to Russia from 
the Western world is mostly provided by Germany (often under strict German credit 
terms). In addition, the Federal Republic is successfully incorporating the Eastern 
countries into its economic sphere of influence. Although establishing such a sphere of 
influence may not be a conscious German foreign policy course, it has de facto become 
the case. Others have argued that Germany has always sought economic domination over 
the East as a way to pursue foreign policy goals.29 Although only 4.1 % of Germany's 
imports came from the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia in 1992; one-third of all 
Eastern European trade is with the Federal Republic, which is making that area ever more 
dependent on the German economy and not vice versa. German trade and investments 
have become so influential in the region that there are currently calls for Russia to 
relinquish its sovereignty in Kaliningrad, openly referred to as Koenigsberg by many 
Germans, and to turn the enclave into a free-trade zone.30 Calls for the neutralization of 
Kaliningrad are also being pursued by Lithuania and Poland, both of which perceive the 
Russian enclave as a threat to them and not as an asset to be used against any possible 
German revisionist tendencies. German-owned businesses are emerging in the East, and 
both the German public and private sectors are actively providing services in order to 
shape the region into a free-market zone well-disposed to German economic interests. 
F. NATO AND THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT 
It is widely acknowledged that the biggest winner in the aftermath of the Cold War 
was Germany. However, Germany could become the biggest loser. If the United States 
pulled out of its commitment to NATO and Germany's defense, the Federal Republic 
could potentially face the worst possible threat scenario that it has ever faced since 1949. 
Germany's leaders, especially those of the ruling coalition, maintain that future stability 
in Central Europe clearly rests on the assumption that the United States will remain 
committed to die collective defense of the NATO countries. Germany feels uncomfortable 
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that would minimize the role of the United States and, by some accounts, would only 
include the United States in situations dealing with Moscow.31 
Germans remember the part that the Americans played in preventing a Third World 
War. The United States was the only country that could counter the Russians and proved 
it during the Berlin crises and the Cuban missile crisis. The United States is also viewed 
by German politicians as a power broker, one that is well-disposed towards Germany's 
policies. The United States also provides an insurance policy to protect Germany against 
any future neo-nationalistic movement that may arise in Russia, one that might want to 
readjust borders. Most important, Germany depends on the United States for its nuclear 
protection guarantees. Germany could be vulnerable to political blackmail if it did not 
have nuclear assurances from a credible ally. Finally, German leaders realize that it is 
wiser to remain allied with the world's only superpower than to take a chance at trying to 
establish some type of security union with militarily weaker and sometimes politically 
unstable allies.32 
Germany values NATO as a safety net and as a means to further its own foreign 
policy interests. When it comes to ensuring its territorial sovereignty, Germany stresses 
the importance of the collective defense aspect of the organization. However, a clash has 
been apparent between the defense and foreign ministries over the issue of NATO 
expansion in the East. The differences over NATO's expansion constitute an example of 
a growing rift over established policy principles. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel wants 
a more moralistic collective approach to security in Europe; whereas Defense Minister 
Volker Ruehe wants Germany to pursue a Realpolitik approach to the security issue. 
Ruehe and General Klaus Naumann are credited with leading the call for a quick eastern 
expansion of NATO and have recently enlisted the support of the Clinton administration 
and a majority of the NATO parliamentarians. In addition, Ruehe has been more blunt 
than U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry about the exclusion of Russian membership 
in NATO.  Ruehe's comments on Russian exclusion include the following: 
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If Russia were to become a member of NATO, it would blow NATO 
apart...It [NATO] would not work. The Poles are learning English for 
NATO but the Russians want us to learn Russian. It [Russia] cannot be 
integrated.33 
However, Ruehe faces an uphill battle with the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who has 
to remain allied with his more liberal coalition partner, Klaus Kinkel, in order to ensure 
his government's political survival. Kohl and Kinkel oppose an accelerated non-EU 
binding expansion of NATO. In other words, Kinkel wants to link NATO membership 
directly with EU expansion, however long that process may take. Kinkel's ultimate goal 
is to have a Europe that has an "enlarged and deepened EU and an expanded Atlantic 
alliance, supplemented by a system of cooperate security supported by the CSCE/OSCE 
and supplemented by a network of...relations...with ...Russia." Kinkel believes that if 
membership is open to only a certain number of countries, then a more greedy power 
[Russia] will incorporate those excluded areas into its zone of influence. Kinkel advocates 
showing consideration for Russia and "moving in convoy". According to Kinkel, 
Germany should not initiate unique and controversial foreign policy proposals. On the 
other hand, Ruehe's primary concern, as the Defense Minister, is for the security of 
Germany. If NATO countries were between Germany and Russia, the Federal Republic 
would become that much more secure. As General Naumann has stated, "Establishing the 
NATO boundary at the Oder and Neisse rivers would be.. .a.. .dividing line. That cannot 
be in our interest and for this reason we are in favor of.. .[the] enlargement of NATO and 
the EU."34 
G. WILL GERMANY LEAN TO THE EAST? 
It is important to stress that Germany will, in all likelihood, remain entrenched in 
the Western European security camp. The important issue for some observers is whether 
Germany will return to a policy of Sciiaukelpolitik, a swaying between the East and West. 
Germany realizes that Russia will remain the biggest threat to its territorial 
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counterbalance such a threat. Historically, the Federal Republic of Germany has proven 
to be a faithful NATO ally. 
The Federal Republic of Germany is credited with establishing a set of principles 
which it has consistently maintained. After Germany suffered through two world wars, 
Nazism, and the Weimar Republic, Adenauer and his successors have steered a course that 
stressed human rights, the integration of all of Europe, and the limitation of central state 
power. These principles were reflected in West Germany's new post-1949 character and 
even in its new name: the Federal Republic. West Germany's constitutional structure was 
extended to East Germany in 1990. Since 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany's 
principles have stood the test of time.35 Even the SPD accepted Germany's membership 
in NATO as being a vital part of the Federal Republic's security posture and continues to 
support European integration efforts. When Gorbachev agreed to reunification in 1990, 
he initially stipulated that Germany could reunite only if it ended its association with 
NATO. It took only a few months for Gorbachev to realize that he was placing an 
unreasonable condition on Germany. When the wall tumbled in 1989, it was the East 
Germans that fled westward and not the West Germans moving eastward.36 
Some argue that Germany is courting Russia and even placing itself under its 
influence, partly due to tradition and partly due to fear.37 As a result of the "Two plus 
Four" Treaty, Germany gave up some of its rights as a nation-state by agreeing to size 
limitations on its armed forces and reaffirming commitments not to obtain NBC weapons. 
However, these agreements should not be construed as giving in to Russian demands. 
German motives were driven by other factors, such as securing the flow of natural 
resources from Russia. Germany also wanted to contain the western movement of the two 
million ethnic German Aussiedlers living in Russia.38 
In addition, the "Two plus Four" Agreement could be interpreted in a quite 
different manner. Some believed that Chancellor Kohl could have argued for a higher 
troop strength for the German military if he had really wanted to do so. However, with 
these military limitations, Kohl could now successfully argue against any future calls by 
NATO, the U.N., or the United States to increase the size of German forces in the event 
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of a future crisis.39 Having its hands tied in advance, as during the Cold War, has proven 
to be quite favorable for Germany. Since its defeat in 1945, Germany has yet to suffer 
a Vietnam or a Korean War and has only lost one soldier to a combat-related incident.40 
Moreover, Germany has no real compelling desire to arm itself with nuclear 
weapons. Instead of feeling a sense of insecurity, Germany's approach is one of cajoling 
others into eliminating nuclear arms or preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Germany has not taken the opposite approach of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability 
because others have them. Germans are opposed to nuclear proliferation and support for 
developing a nuclear arsenal in order to combat such a nuclear threat is supported by less 
than 15% of the population.41 
Instead of Germany leaning to the East or taking a seesaw approach between the 
East and West, Germany remains firmly anchored in the West. In addition, it has also 
taken further steps in its approach to the East by moving political attitudes in that region 
more westward.42 Germany has in fact successfully changed the political attitudes of the 
Eastern Europeans. When the Poles were asked who they thought was the biggest threat 
to the region, many responded that Russia concerned them the most. Only four years 
earlier, the threat perception was more to the west. Germany at that time was viewed as 
a threat to Poland.43 In essence, Germany is succeeding in its pursuit of national interests 
in Central Europe and is doing so in a manner that soothes the concerns of Central 
Europeans (excluding Russia). As a final argument, it would seem ludicrous to think that 
a conservative Germany would risk giving up its favorable security posture in order to 
appease a weak and unstable Russia. Germans do not readily accept change. Germany 
has gone through three generations without a war and will probably not pursue radical 
deviations from its current policies since they have worked so well in the past.44 
H.  SEEKING A WORLD POWER STATUS 
Since reunification, political experts have attempted to determine how far Germany 



















in Bonn have called for Germany to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security 
Council. 
It is important to note that Germany's military has some serious weaknesses that 
prevent it from attaining a super- or (by some definitions) even medium-size power status. 
(The Bundeswehr's weaknesses are further examined in the next chapter.) Germany and 
Japan might become the only permanent members of the U.N. Security Council without 
nuclear weapons. The Bundeswehr has not proven its worth in combat, and the likelihood 
that it will is questionable, at least in the foreseeable future. The military is even smaller 
than what was agreed upon in the "Two plus Four" Treaty. It has no strategic lift or long- 
range air assets and has inadequate C3I and logistical capabilities. All of these factors 
hinder Germany's ability to adequately project its military.45 Most important, German 
politicians have yet to endorse the use of force even during times of crisis (for example, 
in defense of Saudi Arabia or in Bosnia peacekeeping). 
However, some German politicians argue that Germany deserves a position as a 
world decision-maker. Because some German political leaders discount the importance 
of military force, they see the inadequacies of the Bundeswehr as irrelevant factors in 
Germany's desire to attain a world power status. What some Germans have trouble 
accepting is that France and Great Britain have more global decision-making power than 
the Federal Republic. The current structure of the U.N. Security Council is, in their view, 
archaic and reflects the old post-1945 power arrangement, one that is no longer applicable 
in today's world order.46 Finally, Germany can successfully argue that it financially 
contributes more to the world body than most countries. 
The motivation for pursuing a permanent seat on the Security Council stems not 
from a nationalistic desire to attain a world power status but from sentiments of obligation 
and morality. Volker Ruehe's interpretation of President Clinton's call for Germany to 
be a partner in leadership with the United States (a call initiated by President Bush) is that 
Washington wants Germany to bear more of the burdens of international responsibilities 
















The notion of Germany becoming a world leader was initiated by Germany's 
previous Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and has been continued by Klaus 
Kinkel. The term coined by the FDP for such an approach is Weltinnenpolitik, translated 
to mean "world domestic politics." Principles behind Weltinnenpolitik include finding 
solutions to the world's problems through non-military means.48 Germany's foreign policy 
was primarily developed by Genscher, who as the foreign minister from 1974 to 1992, 
advocated the following approaches to German foreign policy: 
1) Germans are obligated to contribute to confidence-building in Europe because 
of their historical responsibility. 
2) Security should ensure that wars are not waged at all. 
3) The West should not use its strength as a lever but rather as a vehicle for 
cooperation. 
4) NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be combined into a collective security 
system. 
Genscher's and Kinkel 's public statements provide little indication that Germany 
wants a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council in order to pursue national interests. 
Instead, Germany wants to influence the world with "morality" and solve global problems 
in a "responsible" manner. 
With Germany facing more pressing domestic issues, the importance of pursuing 
a world leadership role becomes less relevant. Even if German politicians decided not to 
pursue a permanent seat on the Security Council, German citizens would hardly object so 
long as their politicians remained focused on the real issues facing Germany, which are 
combating unemployment and dealing with Eastern Europe.50 
I.  CONCLUSION: ARE GERMANY'S POLICIES SOUND? 
Germany has two assets which complement its security policies. First, Germany 
has patience. Politicians in Bonn do not like to stir up controversy; and seeking quick 
decisions regarding European security and integration would result in problems at home 
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and abroad. A recent example of this sensitivity was provided when Wolfgang Schaeuble, 
head of the CDU faction in the Bundestag, suggested that Germany and a "hard core" 
group of countries accelerate the European Union's integration process and leave others 
to catch up or remain in a lower-tiered status. This not only sparked criticism throughout 
Europe but also within the German ruling coalition. As a result, Germany has cautiously 
proceeded with this idea. Schaeuble and others may have suggested it out of frustration 
because of certain European integration set-backs.51 
Secondly, German leaders are not uniformly naive when it comes to understanding 
the world of Realpolitik. Hans-Peter Schwarz has argued, however, that Germany has yet 
to balance a "moderate" level of power politics with its Moralpolitik. The problem for 
Germany is finding legitimate means of pursuing power interests in situations that require 
assertiveness.52 The CSCE/OSCE is currently unable to carry out the security role that 
some politicians in Germany would like it to play. Hence, Germany continues to 
emphasize the importance of its close relationship with the United States and NATO. This 
relationship has stood the test of time and is widely accepted by the German people. Even 
members of the Alliance 90/Green party believe that Germany should retain its 
membership in NATO.53 
Germany's close relationship with France seems intact. The Federal Republic is 
aware that it cannot pursue its interests if it merely follows the lead of the French. So far, 
the Germans have shown the French that they will cooperate in furthering economic and 
security integration in Europe but only as long as it does not conflict with more pressing 
German interests. The onus of responsibility for making sure that this relationship remains 
intact lies more on the French. The French have realized that the end of the Cold War 
changed Germany's status as a sovereign country. It would be wiser for France to follow 
the advice of a British group of experts that Paris "should be nice to the Germans" instead 
of trying to include the Federal Republic in a French sphere of influence.54 
Finally, Germany has undertaken the vitally important task of trying to promote 
economic and political stability in Eastern Europe. It is an area that Germany has come 
to accept as vital to its interests.   According to Ruehe, failing to expand the EU and 
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NATO in an eastern direction would establish for Germany a "border that represents 
security on one side and insecurity on the other; prosperity on one side and poverty on the 
other."55 In dealing with the East, Germany is reluctantly pursuing limited unilateral 
policies. What Germany is having a difficult time accepting is the importance of power 
factors in East European affairs. According to Jacques Rupnik, "National interest and the 
balance of power rather than a policy based on ethical values and the promise of a 'new 
world order' are the motto of the day for Central Europe's relations with Germany."56 
Although there is a clear need to take a more assertive stance in foreign policy, Germany 
faces numerous constraints. The following chapter examines these constraints, especially 
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JH. CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN ASSERTIVENESS 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the following question: Will Germany 
assume a greater leadership role in international affairs? Germany, a member of the G-7, 
is already an economic superpower that commands the respect of every country in the 
world. It provides a major portion of financial burden sharing to the following 
organizations: 9% of the UN's budget, 22.8% of NATO's, and 30% of the European 
Union's (EU) budget. Not only is it rebuilding its eastern half, but it is also providing 
two-thirds of the capital flow into Eastern Europe.1 The issue, however, is not Germany's 
expanding economic prowess but its ability and willingness to participate in dealing with 
international security challenges. First, this chapter begins by analyzing the contemporary 
German fear of nationalism and discusses its impact on Germany's ability to assume a 
more assertive role, especially a more military one in solving the international security 
problems that have cropped up since the end of the Cold War. The emphasis is on the 
impact of World War II on German political culture. The analysis then focuses on the 
political apparatus and explains how certain recent political events affect Germany's ability 
to increase its leadership role. This chapter then discusses the factors outside Germany 
which influence the equation. Finally, it shows how some contemporary decisions and 
events may increase the prospects for a more assertive German state. 
A.  THE EFFECT OF WORLD WAR H ON THE GERMANS 
Germans still seem to suffer from a pessimistic, guilt-ridden inner feeling and are 
serious-minded people in the truest sense of the word. Most German newspapers do not 
print comics, and many schoolyards do not have playgrounds. Most importantly, "few 
Germans have any taste for militarism, for they have seen what it can lead up to. 
Germany has accomplished so much more by peaceful economic means than it could ever 
obtain by warlike means."2 As Richard Lowenthal pointed out in 1978, Germans have 
















the twentieth century. They suffered bloody annihilation in two world wars, lost their life 
savings in several depressions, and failed repeatedly at democratic reform.3 
Physical reminders of World War n exist in Germany today. Churches and 
downtowns, such as Albrecht Dürer's medieval Nuemburg and the Frauenkirche in 
Munich, were destroyed or heavily damaged. On the other hand, the Wehrmacht and the 
SS barracks, now occupied by NATO forces, suffered more damage from the effects of 
weather than from bullets. The Reichsgelande in Nuernburg, which was made famous by 
the annual September Nazi party rallies, was not even bombed during the war. Neither 
was the Haus der Kunst, neues Rattmus, nor the Fuehrerbau structures in Munich.4 These 
buildings continue to represent symbols of the Nazi past. Hitler's success in winning over 
the masses was partly accomplished by building certain symbols of grandeur in prominent 
places. The above mentioned buildings are ever present reminders of Germany's Nazi 
past; and, unfortunately, they occupy some of Germany's most visible real estate. 
Deliberate reminders of past wars remain today. Most towns and cities dedicate 
prominent memorials to their local fallen soldiers. Church worshippers walk by tablets 
of the town's vermissen (missing soldiers) with churchyards filled with graves or 
memorials to fallen soldiers of both world wars. These memorials are adorned with 
pictures of the deceased mounted on gravestones or church walls. The Nuernburg party 
grounds are now historical landmarks and are under federal protection. Most downtown 
structures reconstructed after 1945 preserve an area of the structure to exhibit the effects 
of the allied bombing raids. 
However, all is not wrought with pessimism in Germany. Germans are quick to 
remind others of their contributions to humanity. Every town seems to have a bridge or 
street dedicated to Von Stauffenburg, the anti-Nazi martyr. Erwin Rommel is a hero to 
many Germans, and his son, Manfred, has made a name for himself as the mayor of 
Stuttgart. One of Germany's frigates is named the Rommel, and was deployed in the 
Adriatic to enforce the U.N. embargo of the former Yugoslavia. The contributions of 
Bach, Goethe, Dürer, Einstein, Kissinger, von Braun, Roentgen, Siemens, and many 
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medieval traditions and often gain international celebrity {Oktoberfest and Fasching). The 
RAND Corporation conducted a study on German self-confidence and found that the 
Germans rated themselves as a positive global role-model for social justice, individual 
freedom, affluence, and culture. The Germans polled were even willing to accept a 
greater international role for their country. However, military roles were unacceptable, 
especially defending the security of allies, protecting states against aggression, and 
balancing the actions of Russia.5 
Although self-confidence may help foster a better domestic climate for a more 
assertive Germany, history, realism and seriousness about life are important societal and 
cultural factors that contribute to German hesitation in assuming such a role. The Vietnam 
War and the ongoing issue of accounting for missing American servicemen continue to 
affect American foreign policy, especially the commitment of ground forces. However, 
the number of Americans lost in Vietnam pales in proportion to the number of German 
soldiers lost during World War EL For example, the number of German soldiers lost in 
the Stalingrad campaign alone was four times greater than the number of Americans killed 
in the entire Vietnam War. German war widows continue to anguish over the loss of their 
loved ones. During the 50th anniversary of Stalingrad, German and Russian journalists 
produced a joint television series documenting the six-month campaign, showing footage 
filmed on location of veterans poignantly recounting their tales of horror. The pain really 
hit home for the Germans when the Russians, either as a token of reconciliation or to 
sharpen the pain, returned several mail bags from long-lost German soldiers back to the 
German government, causing a flood of inquiries from some 20,000 war widows.6 
Attempting to weaken the war-guilt feeling among the Germans can only occur 
after these World War II anniversary years are over in the middle of 1995. Germans today 
are still facing the reality that they must atone for their past; and they continue to do so, 
as witnessed by President Roman Herzog's attendance and speech at the 50th anniversary 
observance of the Warsaw uprising held in August 1994. Herzog clearly stated in his 
address to the Poles that Germany still has regret for what happened during the uprisings 
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Although the apologies for German behavior in World War II were conciliatory, critics 
might contend that some Germans are using such occasions to further their interests by 
obscuring them in "moral" gestures and speeches that atone for the past. 
Finally, the mass media heavily reflect German realism. Unlike in America, news 
is shown during commercial-free primetime, usually around 2015 hours on the three 
partially government-supported non-cable stations. The news format focuses on 
international or domestic events that are of interest to the general public. There is no local 
television news, and media reports are short and concise. However, German citizens 
receive more information concerning worldwide issues than their American counterparts 
for several reasons. News is aired at the top of each hour on every AM and FM radio 
station. Germans are also more exposed to the international world. Practically anyone can 
get in his car and drive no more than four hours and be in any of the nine countries 
bordering Germany. German television news broadcasts may be short, but the important 
issue of the day is given thorough treatment. Of a 20 minute news program, half of that 
time is dedicated to the top story of the day. In contrast, most Americans receive brief 
television news accounts that are designed to attract viewers. 
A country must have a sense of confidence before it can take on the task of solving 
global problems. Americans, Frenchmen, and Britons have accepted the deployment of 
their troops to combat aggression or to alleviate political problems in areas such as the 
Persian Gulf, Panama, Somalia, and Rwanda. This is characteristic of countries whose 
citizens are openly patriotic, or at least, do not fear national pride. On the other hand, 
Germans clearly understand the issues but seem reluctant to involve themselves, especially 
when it includes military risks and when it implies devoting less attention to pressing 
domestic problems. This behavior justifies Schwarz's contention that Germans are serious 
thinkers that hesitate to do anything, "Gedankenschwer und tatenarm." 
According to a RAND study, finding solutions to the world's problems is of only 
secondary concern for many Germans. Over 70% of the Germans believe that the priority 
tasks facing their country involve solving problems concerning extremism, economic 
unity, and ending the war in the neighboring Balkan region.  The latter issue seems to be 
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more fueled by the refugee problem, which is domestically affecting the Germans, than 
any other reason. U.N. peacekeeping missions, demanding a seat on the Security Council, 
or strengthening the European Union were considered priority issues by less than 40 % of 
all respondents.8 Many Germans appear to have embraced a 1992 Clinton campaign 
slogan which stated, "It's the Economy, Stupid!" This slogan clearly represents German 
attitudes about involvement in foreign affairs. 
The relative risk-averse and anti-military attitudes of the post-1945 generations of 
Germans are described by some as being quite disturbing. Even in the_White Paper 1994, 
the Defense Ministry acknowledges that the Bundeswehr's image needs to be improved. 
Although the military is based on conscription, it still maintains a major advertising and 
public relations campaign in order to attract recruits.9 The Bundeswehr is in constant 
competition with more civilian-oriented organizations that offer young men alternatives to 
military service. The outgoing Bundeswehr Defense Commissioner, Alfred Biehle, stated 
that "obligatory military service is threatened in Germany." He went on to say that 28% 
of those that were eligible for military service in 1994 opted instead for civil service. Of 
those inducted into the military, only 7% said that they would be willing to serve in any 
capacity, including "out of area" missions. He also stated that those who enlist are 
increasingly looked upon as "the nation's fools."10 
Another instance of dissent includes the rise of the Green Party in the 1980's. In 
March 1983, at the height of the INF controversy, the party received enough votes to 
overcome the 5 % hurdle and won 27 seats in the Parliament. This was striking because 
tins party's agenda contradicts the conservative values that dominate German society. Once 
the controversy ended, the party lost support. In federal elections in January 1987, the 
Greens won 42 seats in the Bundestag - but only 8 seats in the December 1990 elections, 
which were dominated by national unification issues. The Greens garnered 7.3% of the 
vote (and 49 Bundestag seats) in the October 1994 national election. Environmental and 
economic issues appear to explain the Greens' resurgence. 
During the Persian Gulf War, the German public seemed to take a more serious 

















combat, yet the Super Bowl was still played in front of record crowds. On the other hand, 
Germany, which had no combat forces directly engaged in the 17 January to 28 February 
1991 conflict," canceled Fasching and dedicated extensive media coverage to the 
operation. Although support for allied operations turned overwhelmingly supportive after 
the commencement of operations, only 30% of the Germans polled in January 1991 
supported the use of force in order to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.n German support 
for such a mission in the future involving the Bundeswehr, even though the campaign was 
so successful, has actually waned since 1991.13 
B.  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS: MILITARY 
In addition to these societal challenges, the central governing institutions also have 
characteristics that inhibit Germany in seeking a more influential foreign policy role. 
Public statements from politicians note that Germany must assert itself as a world leader 
but differ on exactly how Germany should pursue such a role. The German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, has been at the forefront of the debate, advocating the extension of the 
Bundeswehr's role outside of Germany and even outside of Europe in support of U.N.- 
sanctioned missions. 
One can argue that the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 forced the Germans to 
realize that Germany must increase its leadership role in order to remain an important actor 
in the realm of world politics.14 More recently, in response to President Clinton's call for 
Germany to assume a greater international leadership role,  Chancellor Kohl replied: 
...America needs a Europe that assumes greater responsibility for itself and 
for international security.... We Germans want to and must shoulder 
responsibility alongside our partners.15 
He also said: 
One cannot be a reunified country with 80 million people with the kind of 
economic strength that we have, with the kind of prestige we claim for 
ourselves, if we do not fully assume our responsibilities and fulfill our 
obligations.16 
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In the White Paper 1994, the German government outlined its foreign policy goals. 
The Bundeswehr's established tasks and missions all reflect an increased need for Germany 
to prepare for participation in "out of area" operations in support of NATO and U.N. 
operations. As a result of Germany no longer being a "front-line country", the 
Bundeswehr is assuming three new tasks: to work in conjunction with NATO forces 
outside of Germany, to contribute to missions in order to prevent international turmoil, and 
to participate in humanitarian and other types of special missions.17 
Some statements and decisions suggest that German politicians are preparing their 
constituents for a more assertive role in foreign policy. However, it is questionable 
whether German political institutions and politicians are fully prepared for such a role. 
Politicians calling for Germany to increase its role in world policy issues are quick to point 
out that it should only be done with the approval of and in conjunction with other 
countries, especially Germany's partners in the EU and NATO. To expect Germany to 
play a leadership role similar to the one America played in winning support for armed 
intervention against Iraq is premature, to say the least. 
Even the White Book 1994 explicitly states that "Germany will never act alone, but 
only with its allies and partners",18 which is to say that it will continue to "move in 
convoy". The Bundeswehr is reducing its size because of the post-Cold War situation and 
as required by the Two Plus Four Agreement. By 1996, the Bundeswehr's strength will 
be 340,000, which is 30,000 less than required by the Agreement. Saving money is 
clearly the major influencing factor. Conscription periods will also be shortened from 12 
to 10 months.19 This is a substantial decrease from the 1980's, when the Bundeswehr, 
representing only West Germany's military, employed 480,000 soldiers serving 
conscription lengths of 15 months.20 The military has no strategic lift or long-range 
logistical capabilities. Germany does not have C-5A aircraft, aircraft carriers, or long- 
range bombers, all of which are essential for a United States-style strategic posture. 
The Bundeswehr has undergone a substantial reduction in force. For example, 

















combat capable artillery battalions, down from 76 battalions. In addition, the artillery 
ceased its nuclear mission, reduced its force level by 50%, and no longer has assets at the 
corps level. According to interviews with several Bundeswehr officers, active duty 
organizations rely on augmentees and conscripts. If forces are mobilized in Germany, 
many units could not deploy without these augmentees. Mobilizing German forces would 
then add a new dimension to a call-up of forces. Using conscripts or mobilized reserves 
for "out of area" missions would certainly result in political controversy and, as 
mentioned earlier, is unpopular among inductees.21 
C.  POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
Not only does the government have to contend with an ever-shrinking military, it 
also has to resolve some organizational dilemmas. The German government faced some 
problems recently as a result of its involvement in the Rwanda relief effort. The 
humanitarian mission involved four ministries: the defense, interior, foreign service, and 
the economic development ministries. Coordination among these agencies was described 
as chaotic. To deal with future catastrophes, one government official commented, it could 
take an unacceptable three weeks to organize a similar relief effort if steps are not taken 
to better organize these operations. Politicians are calling for plans to pool resources by 
establishing information banks. A special corps is currently being looked at for the 
specific purpose of undertaking to humanitarian missions. Other arguments also arise on 
who will fund these missions.22 
Additionally, German political parties are still divergent on how involved Gennany 
should be in international affairs. Though the current coalition supports seeking a greater 
role for Gennany, the leading opposition party (SPD), wants to limit the Bundeswehr to 
strictly humanitarian and economic operations. Rudolf Scharping, leader of the SPD, has 
said that Germany should not pursue a more military-oriented role : 
Wir wollen keine militärische Führungsrolle, viellicht können wir eine 
ökologische übernehmen. (We do not want a military role [in terms of 
international responsibility], perhaps we can take an ecological one.)23 
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Even in light of the German Constitutional Court's ruling expanding the right of 
the Bundeswehr to participate in NATO and UN missions outside of German boundaries, 
there still continues to be a lot of political debate over what missions are considered 
legitimate. Kohl has had to bulldoze his way through public opinion and opposition from 
the SPD in order to pave the way for a greater German involvement during these times of 
international turmoil and troubles. The SPD and even Kohl's coalition partner, the FDP, 
took the ruling government to court to seek a ruling on the constitutionality of German 
military contributions in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. By American standards, 
these missions were considered low-key, low-risk operations. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court) ruled in favor of the ruling government. 
The Bundeswehr can now deploy outside of German borders as long as such missions are 
sanctioned by an international organization such as the U.N. or NATO, and the 
deployment receives the approval of the German legislature.24 
Rudolf Scharping, the SPD opposition leader, said that the recent court decision 
still does not give the Bundeswehr the right to participate in Gulf War types of missions, 
while the Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, disagrees with that assertion and says that the 
ruling legalizes such missions.25 Even in light of this ruling, the current government is 
still taking precautionary steps and is trying to define the future role of the Bundeswehr 
in international operations. Volker Ruehe, the Defense Minister, reiterated after the 
Karlsruehe decision that there would be no change to Germany's current contributions in 
the Balkans; and, furthermore, he could not foresee a military role for Germany in a 
partnership deployment with France to Rwanda.26 
D.  EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
Germany is also aware that it must be sensitive to the fears of its neighbors. A 
country 80 million strong, located in the heart of Europe, with a strong economy and a 
history marked by aggression, causes many in smaller and less powerful countries in 
Europe a great amount of anxiety. For others, a strong Germany causes envy. Hysteria 
















caused by Germany's blundering. For example, the events involving the incarceration of 
Rudolf Hess and the arrangements after his death were treated so secretively by the Allies 
that they not only captured the interest of the media but of right-wing extremists as well. 
A platoon of Allied soldiers stood watch over a single prisoner for over 20 years, and only 
a few people had access to him. Even the soldiers guarding Hess never saw him.27 Upon 
his death, Spandau prison, where he was held, was quickly dismantled and the bricks 
buried in an undisclosed location. Even as recently as 1994, German police used 
helicopters and roadblocks to prevent any gatherings from observing the anniversary of his 
death. Media coverage, publications, and exhibits of past Nazi atrocities and 
contemporary extremism command a strong market not only in Germany but in other 
countries as well. 
Germany's political blunders and actions have also contributed to this hysteria. In 
1985, Chancellor Kohl embarrassed President Reagan by escorting him to a war cemetery 
in Bitburg which contained the remains of several thousand Waffen SS soldiers.28 The 
Chancellor also delayed recognizing the current Polish-German border during reunification 
treaty talks in 1990. This caused a great amount of consternation for the Poles and for 
several American senators, who in turn lodged a protest with President Bush.29 Kohl also 
met with the Spanish minister on the 50th anniversary of the Normandy invasions, even 
though Spain was a fascist state during World War n. Finally, eyebrows were raised 
when Germany was the first to recognize Croatia, a former Nazi puppet state that was 
notorious for carrying out atrocities against the Serbs during World War II. Germany's 
method of recognizing the breakaway Yugoslav states alarmed a number of worldwide 
leaders. 
During the Persian Gulf war, Germany was embarrassed when the world found out 
that it had contributed to Iraq's NBC and conventional weapons development. Iraq fired 
an untold number of SCUD missiles at Israel during the war, and this caused a "complex 
effect" in German minds, owing to: 
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.. .the interaction of several factors: the knowledge of a certain degree of 
German involvement in the Iraqi missile and chemical weapons buildup, 
German historical guilt, respect for and willingness to support the 
responsible attitude of the Israeli leadership and population under attack, 
the realization of the vulnerability of democratic societies to such attacks, 
and the recognition of the somewhat forgotten fact that Israel is one of the 
Western democratic nations and deserves more than the 'moral impartiality' 
with which the whole Middle East had been treated [by Germans]. 
After the firing of these missiles at Israel, the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, made a hasty visit there to help defuse the situation.30 
Fears continue to linger, and Germans are constantly reminded of their history. 
During the ceremonies marking the departure of the former Soviet forces from Germany, 
President Yeltsin reminded the German people that the Nazi regime was the most evil one 
that has ever existed in history.31 Reminding the Germans of their evil past is a typical 
political ploy used by many countries in order to skirt a touchy subject that might 
otherwise cause them embarrassment, such as Russia's domination of the East German 
people during the Cold War. Comments about the Nazi past seem to make the papers and 
often influence the way events are reported. Perhaps, journalists exploit the opportunities 
available to them in order to express their own views about fears of an overbearing 
Germany. According to a recent study of noted leaders within the different institutions in 
America, 65 % of all news media respondents did not support an increased military role 
for Japan and Germany in proportion to their economic strength. They also believed that 
Germany will one day be the dominant power in Europe.32 
Margaret Thatcher has been more open about her suspicions of a reunited 
Germany. Her fear is one of a Europe centered around a strong Germany that is "so large 
that it cannot be easily fitted into the new architecture of Europe." She uses the analogy 
of Germany being a bull in a china shop to explain her view of a reunited Germany in a 
delicate European atmosphere. She points out repeatedly in her memoirs that she and 
Mitterrand were both opposed to Germany's quick reunification.33 Were it not for Kohl's 
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Germany is limited in where it can influence international affairs. Because of its 
Nazi past, it can do no more than act as a peripheral player in the Balkans. Recognizing 
Croatia was Germany's first instance of showing initiative on a solo foreign policy 
decision. This action was opposed by the United States and other European powers and 
especially by the Serbians. Germany's leaders seriously thought that the best way to end 
the bloodshed in the Balkans was to recognize the right to self-determination of the 
breakaway states. It had other reasons too, such as a strong Croatian refugee influx and 
historical and cultural ties to the region. However, its pressure tactics in forcing other 
countries to go along with its desires to recognize Slovenia and Croatia caused lots of 
concern among the Europeans and raised fears of an overpowering Germany. The Serbian 
press also seized the opportunity to remind Serbs of Germany's past atrocities in the early 
1940's, during a war in which Serbia sided with the Allied powers and Croatia with the 
Axis.34 Shortly after Germany's recognition of the breakaway Balkan states, The New. 
York Times reported: 
Germany has shown a new and more assertive face internationally. On 
matters ranging from interest rates to the war in Yugoslavia, German 
leaders have staked out bold policies and then waited for their European 
partners to line up behind them. 
Buoyed by unification, responding to old interests and new passions, 
Germany has decided to exercise its economic strength, to become Europe's 
dominant political and diplomatic force.35 
Some experts even referred to Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the 
interest rate hikes by the Bundesbank as proof that the Federal Republic, "like its 
predecessors, ... is a revisionist power, intent on reshaping Europe."36 
Germany will always raise eyebrows when its soldiers are placed on the world's 
center stage. When France celebrated Bastille Day in 1994, Bundeswehr personnel 
carriers and soldiers made the front page pictures in the world wide press reports. 
Whether fears of an overbearing Germany will disappear in the foreseeable future 
is unclear. These fears may decline as the post-1945 generation of leaders takes over the 
helm of world leadership.   President Clinton seems to be very supportive of a strong 
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Germany. President Clinton's agenda is domestically focused, and any assistance he can 
get to help the United States shoulder international responsibilities would be welcome. 
Most countries, as long as their own interests are furthered, do not mind an 
actively involved Germany sharing the burdens of keeping the peace. American officials 
acknowledge that Germany is the main economic powerhouse in Europe; and, as such, 
Germany holds the key to integrating the Eastern states into the greater framework of 
European prosperity. Germany's economy is the only one on the continent that is capable 
of lowering trade barriers to the point that eastern economies can successfully and fairly 
trade with the West. America's developing "special relationship" (a term often associated 
with American-British relations) with Germany is clearly based on the premise that 
Germany holds the key to development in the East and accepts that responsibility.37 
France also accepts the fact that it needs Germany's assistance to help solve 
international problems. Defense Minister Frangois Leotard is quite open about Germany 
being a critical player in the realm of world politics. He even goes as far as to say that 
the German people were not enemies of the French during World War II but were instead 
victims of an oppressive regime. He calls for Germany to participate in military 
operations such as the one recently fought by coalition forces in the Persian Gulf and 
argues that the Bundeswehr should not be hindered from deploying to areas such as 
Africa.38 Leotard does point out that Germany should deploy within the confines of the 
European Corps and his examples of where Germany should deploy seem to be in areas 
that are of France's immediate concern. However, German Defense Minister, Volker 
Ruehe, is not willing to allow Germany to be used as a tool to further someone else's own 
interests and rejected any idea of Germany participating with the French in Rwanda.39 
In contrast to the political situation in the 1980's, Germany now realizes that it 
must assume more international responsibilities. Owing to the end of the Cold War, 
U.S. troop levels in Europe are in 1995 only a third of what they were in 1990, and the 
Russians have removed their forces from Germany. Several Central European countries 






















on a whole new set of responsibilities.  Some argue that it is now time for Germany to act 
like a "normal" state.40 
Timothy Ash presents four policy courses Germany could pursue in the future. He 
suggests that Germany could continue to build on its relationship with France, making the 
two the center of power in Europe. Another course might be to expand the European 
Union by going eastward and incorporating the former Warsaw Pact countries. Another 
alternative could be for Germany to expand its own role and become a world power. 
Finally, Germany could develop a stronger relationship with the Russians. All of these 
options have their advantages and disadvantages. Arguments against these options include 
a reluctance on the part of Germany to become engulfed in a German-French power bloc. 
Secondly, integrating the Eastern states into Europe too fast could further strain 
Germany's relations with the French and the British and create a European dumping 
ground for cheap labor and goods. Also, Germany does not seem quite ready to assume 
a world power role especially when its D-mark already gives it great influence. Finally, 
Germany is well-seated in the Western community and probably will not seek an eastern 
alliance with Russia. After all that has happened in Russia, most Germans seem to eye 
that country with suspicion.41 
Elizabeth Pond reports that the Germans continue to appreciate America's 
involvement in European affairs and view American troops stationed in their country more 
as an insurance measure than as a liability or an imposition on their sovereignty. With the 
U.S. well-established in NATO, the Germans are not only assured of continued American 
security protection, but have an ally that sides with them, more often than not, when 
disagreements arise between Germany and France, Great Britain or Russia.42 During 
President Clinton's visit to Germany, Chancellor Kohl was very supportive of the United 
States presence in Germany, saying that he was "grateful [to Clinton] ... for having 
promised . . . that the U.S. will maintain a military presence of 100,000 in Europe."43 
Although predictions of Germany's future leadership role should be offered with 
caution, it is probably safe to assume that the Germans will do what seems best for 
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stature as a dominant force in Europe.44 He holds that Germany's foreign policy history 
has always reflected disguised but conscious decisions to further its own interests. Some 
argue that furthering one's own interests is what politics is all about, whether one's past 
includes time as a Nazi state or a Communist state or not. From such a viewpoint, 
morality has no bearing on the issue. Heilbrunn asserts that German leaders from 
Adenauer to Kohl have always claimed that German interests are European interests, 
although that has not always been the case. Germany's insistence on the expansion of the 
EU and NATO continues to upset the French since it diminishes their ability to be a 
dominant power in the European Union. The Ostpolitik started by Chancellor Willy 
Brandt was often conducted to the chagrin of the Americans. However, it ultimately paid 
off and helped to expedite the departure of Russian troops from Germany. By the time 
reunification occurred, years of Ostpolitik had helped to forge relationships in the East. 
Now a huge trading block exists between the Germans and the Eastern nations, with 
France and the United Kingdom in secondary positions. Currently, Germany exports 
goods worth billions of D-marks to the countries on its eastern border. 
Although Jacob Heilbrunn admits that Germany depends on the United States for 
nuclear protection, he goes on to say that the Federal Republic will be a "less pliable 
ally."45 However, as long as the risk of nuclear proliferation persists and NATO remains 
a viable security system, it is reasonable to expect German politicians to continue allowing 
Americans to occupy an "apartment" in their country's building. As one German student 
put it in a dialogue with Rand Corporation researchers, "War - that is something we leave 
to the Americans".46 With that type of attitude prevalent in German society, German 
politicians find it less politically risky to embrace American protection guarantees than to 
seek an independent and possibly less reliable European security alternative. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
In summation, it appears probable that Germany will continue to take an ambiguous 
course in asserting itself regarding solutions to world problems. Timothy Ash says it best 










of least resistance as long as it is in its best interests. However, to say Germany will be 
complacent would be inaccurate. Though the military continues to draw down, it has 
already participated in several missions considered unthinkable before Germany's 
reunification. The Bundeswehr helped in mineclearing operations in the Persian Gulf, 
provided humanitarian aid to Kurdish rebels in Iraq, continues to support U.N. sanctions 
against Iraq, participated in relief efforts in Somalia, provides naval and air assets for 
embargo enforcement and other purposes in the ongoing Yugoslavian crisis, and even lost 
its first soldier since the end of World War II while supporting a medical mission in 
Cambodia.48 Germany is a critical player in international politics and realizes that its 
soldiers are expected to help keep the peace. 
Beyond culture and history, however, another pressing domestic issue that 
constrains German politicians in conducting security policy is the importance of the 
economic challenges facing the Federal Republic. The next chapter analyzes the economic 
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IV. GERMANY'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the economic challenges facing Germany 
since its reunification in 1990. The two most important economic challenges facing 
Germany are its economic reunification and its overburdened social market economy. One 
must understand these challenges because they are what concern the Germans the most. 
Indeed, these challenges constitute the greatest constraining factor affecting Germany's 
ability to assert itself in foreign policy. In the first sections, the economic and political 
events preceding German reunification are addressed. In addition, the problems that the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) inherited when it united with the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) are analyzed. The relative successes and failures of the 
economic measures implemented by the Bonn government to correct these problems are 
also discussed. The second part of this chapter critically examines Germany's overtaxed 
social welfare system and the implications associated with it. This part specifically looks 
at the main macroeconomic factors that are hindering Germany's economic 
competitiveness in the world market. In the final analysis, the problems associated with 
reunification and the social welfare system both contribute to Germany's economic and 
political troubles. The costs associated with reunification merely exacerbate the difficulties 
of an already troubled economy. Germany is trying to remain competitive in today's 
trading world in spite of its overregulated bureaucracy and costly social welfare structure.1 
In order to remain competitive, the government realizes, it must undertake innovative 
reforms designed to concurrently solve the problems of Germany's social welfare system, 
its reunification, and to respark a sense of united kinship among the German Volk. 
A. THE IMPACT OF ECONOMICS ON POLITICS 
It is important to understand the ramifications of Germany's economic woes. The 
United States relationship with Germany is predicated on the assumption that the economic 
challenges facing Europe, especially the ones facing the Eastern states, can only be solved 











best able to overcome the economic stagnation in the East. It is also viewed as the 
"engine" that will drive Europe towards economic prosperity, which will in turn promote 
stability in the region.2 Spain's Prime Minister. Felipe Gonzalez, said, "if Germany fails, 
we will all fail as well."3 
As the Cold War era fades, economic power is becoming even more important as 
a policy instrument for Bonn's politicians. Even in military circles within democratic 
countries, there is a realization that influence today is gained more through economic 
might than through military means. As the German defense ministry points out, "Today, 
a country's international influence is determined more by economic dynamism and 
technological innovation, by the competition for future markets and resources than by 
military might."4 In a country where power politics and the use of force are looked upon 
with ambivalence and misgivings, economic measures have evolved into a permanent part 
of Germany's foreign policy options. 
B.  EVENTS LEADING TO REUNIFICATION 
The process of German reunification was dominated by political events. 
Chancellor Kohl saw an opportunity to reunify his country as long as Gorbachev remained 
in power. The Cold War was still fresh in Kohl's mind, and he seized the initiative to 
reunify the German states before the Russians had second thoughts. Kohl pushed for quick 
reunification even though fellow allied leaders like Thatcher and Mitterrand, as well as 
domestic forces such as the opposition SPD, were all calling for a slowing down of the 
process. In addition, the world's focus was turning towards the Persian Gulf, especially 
after Iraq's annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. Kohl knew that reunification might be 
sidelined by events in the Middle East if the Two plus Four Agreement was not quickly 
ratified. 
Domestically, Chancellor Kohl was feeling pressure from the five eastern Länder 
to reunify. Erich Honecker, the leader of the GDR, refused to initiate economic reforms 
and continued to maintain a rigid, authoritarian hold on his state even though it was 
obvious that changes needed to be made.   After Honecker's resignation, the new regime 
64 
t      i   .      
      ,    m  
2 '      nn  
 ill ll il  ll. ,,3 
        
        
,       
  nn     , 
 nn









was in office for only a month before the wall went down. The GDR basically had no 
time to change its old system. Because East Germany did not reform itself, Kohl was 
forced to take expedient measures towards economic consolidation even before political 
union was achieved. By the spring of 1990, 500,000 East Germans had crossed into the 
FRG, placing great strains on both German states. The GDR was losing its labor pool and 
political legitimacy, and the FRG was overwhelmed with the incoming tide of refugees. 
Because of widespread fears of an impending economic and political collapse, the GDR 
was forced to hold elections within 5 months of the wall's collapse in November 1989. 
Kohl's party, the Christian Democrats, won the election in the GDR. The election results 
were clear indicators to politicians in Bonn that reunification was impending. The GDR's 
government had failed to retain its legitimacy in free elections, and its economic base was 
in disarray. These factors led to Germany's reunification within a year of the wall's 
collapse.5 
Economists were less vocal about their opposition to quick reunification because 
they tended to believe the politicians in Bonn who were proclaiming that the total costs of 
modernizing the eastern provinces would be relatively low: only 22 billion DM.6 There 
was also a popular belief that the reunification would take the form of another economic 
miracle, or Wirtschaftswunder, comparable to the one that successfully rejuvenated West 
Germany in the late 1940's and 1950's. In remembering the West German 
Wirtschaftswunder, economists stressed the importance of setting up a tax haven in the 
eastern region in order to draw investors. However, the Kohl government quickly 
dismissed this idea for fear that Western firms would use the new states as a means to 
evade taxes, sparking a similar demand for such a program in all of Germany.7 
C. EAST GERMANY: THE EPITOME OF ECONOMIC RUIN 
On paper, the GDR looked healthy. Prior to its dissolution, it had the most 
prosperous and most productive economy of all the Eastern European countries. It was 
agriculturally self-sufficient and had a large industrial base. Even Western analysts praised 










Italy.8 However, no one seemed to understand that there was little in common with a 
communist and a free market system. It was only after reunification that the true state of 
the East German economy was fully discovered. The GDR was fraught with inefficiency. 
For example, Bonn was surprised to find that over a hundred thousand East German 
citizens were employed in the internal security field, a large number for a country of only 
16 million. 
The GDR's entire economic orientation was controlled by the government: it 
stressed central planning and was completely autarkic in nature. The Honecker regime 
failed to adjust to technological advances and did not care about consumer demands. GDR 
citizens realized that their standard of living was eroding, but the internal security system 
helped prevent unrest. Practically everyone employed in industry worked in a 
government-owned factory, and all financial and transportation agencies were nationalized. 
There were few incentives to produce efficiently since employees and managers had hardly 
any stake in their firms. Wages were kept relatively uniform, and standards of living 
remained low when compared to those of the West. All of the aforementioned factors 
contributed to lower worker productivity. With all other indicators being held constant, 
worker productivity was only one third of what it was in the FRG. 
Because of limited foreign capital and the absence of a free market, the central 
planning program was forced to set priorities regarding production and other economic 
activities. The program emphasized certain areas and neglected others. The neglected 
areas included the country's infrastructure and environment. Because of the great costs 
associated with maintaining a clean environment, the GDR evolved into an ecological 
disaster zone. After reunification, some private investors were hesitant about buying 
companies in the East because they feared that they would get stuck with the clean-up bill. 
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According to an economist, Sharon Nuskey, 
... an estimated 40 percent of the natural gas in eastern Berlin' s pipeline 
system leaks out before it reaches consumers. The water, soil and sewage 
systems are also in appalling disrepair. A third of its inland waterways and 
9,000 of its lakes are biologically dead; fully 55 percent have almost lost 
the ability to regenerate themselves. One study reports that only 2.4 
percent of the natural water supply is of drinking water quality. Two- 
thirds of the 8,000 officially designated communities lack sewage treatment 
plants and 10,000 of the 11,000 household waste disposal sites are illegal 
and operate without regard to safety standards. The region also has 
approximately 15,000 registered toxic sites.10 
The transportation system was antiquated, to say the least. One half of all roads 
and bridges were in need of repair. Private investors not only faced an outmoded 
infrastructure, but also significant costs associated with modernizing their firms. Less than 
30% of all rail assets were electrically run. Most of the highways (autobahns) pre-dated 
the Second World War. 
In the realm of consumer products and telecommunications, only 1 out of 10 people 
had a telephone. Of those that had telephones, many were on party lines. Those wanting 
telephones had to wait 20 years for one. Only one out of every two households possessed 
a color television or a car, and only 10% of the people owned an automatic washing 
machine. Less than half of all homes had modern heating systems, and 50% of all houses 
were over 100 years old.11 Sensing disaster upon unification in October 1990, the Bonn 
government quickly realized that it had to come up with some measures to equalize living 
standards. 
D. CURRENCY REFORM 
By July 1990, Bonn had agreed to a currency reform allowing East Germans a one 
Ostmark for one D-mark exchange rate on the first 2000 Ostmarks that East Germans 
owned. Savings exceeding that amount were traded at a two for one exchange rate. The 
purpose of this quick monetary reform was to stop the flow of refugees. With new D- 






l m   
 11
overabundant supply of Eastern products, which either rotted in warehouses or collected 
dust on grocery shelves.12 
What the politicians in Bonn did not realize was that economic stability in the 
former GDR was based on its ability to export goods to its former Eastern trading 
partners. During the Cold War, that trading bloc was called the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA). Once the Ostmark standard was dropped and replaced by 
the DM, the reform measure increased the prices of the GDR's commodities by some 
400%. This essentially wiped out East Germany's export market, which was only partly 
salvaged when the Bonn government intervened with subsidies. GDR goods were too 
expensive to export, especially to those countries in the former CMEA where currencies 
were still based on the Russian rouble.13 
Central bankers were not pleased with currency reform. Indeed, the president of 
the Bundesbank, Karl-Otto Pohl, resigned his position.14 Wolfgang Schaeuble stated after 
reunification that if "a realistic picture of the fiscal burdens to come had been made public, 
the West German electorate and parliament's acceptance of rapid reunification would have 
been jeopardized."15 The Council of Economic Experts proposed in February 1990 a five- 
year gradual economic unification of the two states, but the central government in Bonn 
did not adopt the plan and "decided to subordinate economic considerations to the political 
imperative of unification. "I6 
Since East German products generally retained the same poor quality and high cost 
as before reunification, the currency reform grossly overvalued these goods. The former 
GDR's markets were cut off, and monetary transfers totalling some 140 billion DM were 
needed to subsidize industries and workers. These subsidies amounted to welfare because 
the government was supporting products that could not be sold in the West. Workers were 
producing things of inferior quality at twice the expense of what similar items would have 
cost if these items had been made in the western part of the country. In addition, since 
there was no effective government or bureaucracy in the East, everything had to be 
reorganized from the bottom up: the banking industry, the legal system, and all 
governmental agencies.  Even worse, Kohl compounded the problem by transferring the 
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overregulated social welfare system that existed in the West to the East, which made it 
more prohibitive for businesses and entrepreneurs to start up companies. In spite of the 
massive aid and infusion of credit, and the creation of a democratically oriented public 
sector, many firms were forced to close their doors. Industrial production declined 60% 
within the first year of reunification, and unemployment increased to over 15%. Why 
would businessmen invest in a place where workers seemed overpaid and unskilled 
(compared to Western standards) and where businesses were overregulated? Many 
reasoned that it would be wiser to invest in another country, such as Poland, and earn 
greater revenues by employing Polish workers for $2 an hour in a less regulated 
environment.  Polish labor costs are only 10 to 20% of German wages.17 
E. MONEY TRANSFERS 
Instead of the projected 22 billion DM pricetag for reunification as was originally 
planned back in 1990, the German government is instead transferring an average of 100 
billion DM a year to its five eastern Länder. Two-thirds of these transfers are devoted to 
social and public sector reforms which place a greater financial burden on the state than 
on private investors. The table below summarizes some estimates of the costs of 
economically revitalizing the five eastern states and modernizing them to Western 
standards: 
Housing improvements 52 billion DM 
Rail improvements 84 billion DM 
Industrial privatization > 250 billion DM 
Postal Reforms 129 billion DM 
Interest > 40 billion DM 
Old GDR debts/Environment 300 billion DM 
Transportation Reform 100 billion DM 
The interest amount mentioned in the above table reflects the finance charges on money 
borrowed by the government.18 The huge privatization debt is later discussed in a later 
section of this chapter. 
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The amount of money going East is so astronomical that it totals over twice the 
amount the Americans provided to West Germany by way of the Marshall Plan. Germany 
is now a deficit-ridden nation. The Federal Republic has practically doubled its national 
debt in the five years since reunification. For the Germans, running a debt is alarming 
news. It goes against the cultural grain of sparen (saving), and these deficits could spill 
over into the country's psyche, changing the attitude of its citizens into one that is more 
like the Americans - accepting a large public deficit with little anxiety. 
The German government garnered a financial surplus in 1989 when it took in 5.5 
billion DM more than it spent.'9 However, that surplus ended right after reunification. 
Total public sector deficits of 69.4 and 94.4 billion DM were recorded in 1990 and 1991 
respectively. Future projections expect a growing deficit with interest payments 
consuming some 15% of future budgets. 20 
In this situation, the state must make some difficult choices: either tax its citizens 
or borrow money. The government decided to raise taxes and borrow money. Because 
of its historical consequences. Germans remain fearful of inflation. However, raising 
taxes is unpopular; and borrowing money is difficult because of pressures placed on the 
government by the Bundesbank. Seeking economic policies that are anti-inflationary has 
been a long-standing political course for most post-war Bonn governments. Recent 
measures include increasing the value-added tax a full percentage point to 15% and raising 
other types of taxes as well. Budget cuts were directed at several areas, including the 
military, the Berlin movement plan, and social assistance packages. In spite of increased 
taxation and budget cuts, the government was still unable to raise the revenues needed to 
fund reunification and was therefore obliged to borrow money. 
Part of the deficit problem was the government's failure to reallocate certain 
budgetary cuts into urgent areas. Another reason was the pressing financial obligations 
that suddenly cropped up after reunification. These included financial contributions to 
coalition efforts in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, support and credit packages to fund 
revitalization in Eastern Europe,  and funding the Russian troop withdrawal from 
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Germany.2' Finally, the costs of reunification are proving to be far greater than originally 
estimated. 
F.  TREUHANDANSTALT 
One of the first problems facing the Kohl government was what to do with its 
Eastern workers and industries. An organization called the Treuhandanstalt (which may 
be translated as a "trusteeship institution") was set up to accomplish three aims: to transfer 
the old GDR state-run businesses into profitable firms, to close the unsalvageable ones, 
and to sell firms to foreign companies under the condition that investors maximize the 
number of employees.22 
The roadblocks confronting this agency were numerous. Many former pre-World 
War II property owners laid claims to real estate in the East. Altogether, there were over 
2 million property claims, and only 5% of those claims were resolved by 1993. These 
claims, however, mainly concerned property issues which allowed Treuhand to continue 
with the privatization of companies.23 
The agency was forced to make some tough decisions: either operate businesses 
that were hopelessly unproductive or shut them down and place people on the dole. A case 
in point involves the Pentacon camera firm. That particular firm was thought to be a 
financially strong one since it earned 75 % of its profits from foreign sales. However, the 
production means in that firm were technologically backwards, resulting in high costs. 
The old Honecker government was forced to subsidize the company in order to keep it in 
business. Camera making was so unprofitable that the state subsidized Pentacon at a rate 
of $500 towards the production costs of each camera. Treuhand decided that it would be 
cheaper to shut Pentacon's doors and place its 5600 employees on welfare than to 
restructure the unprofitable company.24 
Treuhand also compromised with investors in order to sell off industries, 
businesses, and restaurants in a timely manner. It was successful in privatizing 15,000 
businesses. Treuhand was disbanded in January 1995 after having completed its mission, 
















over 200 billion DM worth of investments in the eastern Länder.25 But what were the 
costs for Treuhand' s success? 
Treuhand incurred a debt of over 250 billion DM, which was passed on to the 
state. When investors assumed responsibility for their firms, they were relieved of any 
prior debts held against their newly acquired companies. Developers were also able to 
compromise over the ecological issue, thus avoiding environmental clean-up costs. 
Treuhand also sold businesses at prices below market value in order to quickly get rid of 
them. Finally, the government inherited a huge unemployed population. In order to 
remain competitive, new business owners had to cut workers in order to keep up with 
expensive salaries and start-up costs. Of the 4 million employees working in companies 
originally controlled by Treuhand, more than half were forced out of employment or 
rerouted into another job. Some of those laid off workers were rerouted into public sector 
jobs, a circumstance which placed the responsibility of paying their salaries on the state.26 
With the recession in Europe, some private investors are backing out of their deals. 
For example, the Swiss-based Alcor company is trying to annul its agreement because its 
expected market in Russia fell through. Another company is currently employing only 
1200 out of the 7200 people that originally worked for that firm. Some investors are 
merely using the land that their businesses rest on as an investment holding and are 
stripping away their firm's assets and moving them elsewhere.27 The problem has grown 
to the point that another agency is being formed after Treuhand's retirement in order to 
renegotiate and settle ongoing privatization transactions. 
G. HINDSIGHT: WHERE LIES THE BLAME? 
The bottom line is that Germany's reunification costs are averaging 120 billion DM 
per year, all for the sake of supporting five Länder that are currently producing at only 
30% of the productive capacity that they had attained at the height of the Honecker 
regime. The entire output value of all five eastern states is still less than that of the 
Daimler-Benz auto works.   According to some observers, the eastern states hang on to 
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Germany like a "ball and chain" hindering economic and political progress for the nation 
as a whole.28 
The politicians in Bonn made a crucial mistake: they overestimated the GDR's 
economic potential. They failed to foresee the economic costs of rebuilding the former 
GDR from the bottom-up. They thought they could merely make a few adjustments here 
and there and build on to a strong foundation. Secondly, the West German 
Wirtschaftswunder of the 1950's was mistakenly used as a model for revitalizing the ex- 
GDR even though the conditions for redevelopment were quite different from those that 
had existed in West Germany in the late 1940's.29 
The post-war economic miracle was very gradual and occurred under catastrophic 
conditions. Germany had been devastated after six years of war. This resulted in a 
currency reform that was a lot more draconian than that in 1990. West Germans initially 
received only 40 DM and all Reichsmarks were exchanged at a 10 for 1 exchange rate. 
The Erhard policy of free enterprise allowed investment firms practically free rein. The 
need to fulfill the social welfare demands and expectations of the 1980's and 1990's did 
not exist. The German people were destitute. The Bonn government only intervened in 
cases of unfair business practices. Infrastructure rebuilding was given priority. Most 
important, the Marshall Plan provided the foreign capital needed to restart certain 
companies. Other industries, such as coal and steel, were consolidated into wider 
European endeavors. Unlike the current plan for reunification, the Marshall Plan was also 
a big psychological boost, in that it allowed the West Germans to believe that America 
would take care of them. Finally, the entire social reform aspect of the West German 
economy was not even started until the state was back on its feet and the economy was 
well on its way to recovery. 
In contrast, in 1990, Kohl's government placed constraints on the former GDR 
from the beginning. West German regulations and an intricate bureaucracy were 
transplanted to the East. Monetary transfers were hefty; but, as mentioned earlier, two- 
thirds of the funds were used to finance the public sector. Finally, the currency reform 
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strength.31 The currency reform was also designed to provide GDR citizens with instant 
gratification in order to stem the refugee flow. It was not gradual, in contrast with the 
monetary reforms in the immediate post-1945 period in West Germany. The former GDR 
citizens felt persecuted and demanded instant compensation. 
Most important, critics argued that Chancellor Kohl's approach to reunification tore 
apart national unity. Eastern German workers were not as productive as those in the 
western part. They were not market-oriented and relied on entitlements from the state. 
The whole concept of capitalism was new to the Ossis (easterners). As time went on, this 
invariably caused consternation in the western half of the country. On the other hand, the 
former East Germans felt like second-class citizens. As one frustrated eastern German 
union leader put it, "We were simply annexed."32 Because of the differing circumstances 
and approaches in the post-1945 revitalization in West Germany and the 1990 
reunification, the outcomes were quite different. 
However, the blame for the problems does not rest entirely on Kohl's government. 
The real problems with Germany's economy stem not just from its reunification dilemma 
and the tremendous social and ecological damage caused in East Germany by 45 years 
under Communist rule (1945-1990). The problems stem from another larger issue: 
Germany's social welfare orientation. West Germans argued that their dwindling social 
welfare benefits and higher taxes were due to the cost of consolidating their country. 
However, these entitlement cuts were also the result of Germany's growing and 
overburdened social welfare economic system, one that was started in the late 1950's.33 
H.  SOCIAL WELFARE ECONOMY 
Chancellor Kohl criticized the Germans for failing to accept reductions and 
limitations in the state's cradle-to-grave welfare system. The phrase coined by him to 
describe Germany's state welfare system is kollektiver Freizeitpark, or state amusement 
park. In his view, Germany's social welfare programs are practically strangling that 
country out of the export market and into a serious dilemma.34 In the early 1980's, 
Germany enjoyed a huge export-oriented economy.  Most of its goods were sold to other 
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European countries, which bought those items with strong currencies. Now many of 
Germany's export markets are depressed because its trading partners are in a recession. 
The Pacific rim has expanded its export market worldwide, even in Europe. Germany has 
been slower to reciprocate in its export expansion. Currently, Germany exports only 7% 
of its products to the Pacific rim. This problem is further compounded by the fact that the 
Asian countries and the Eastern European countries are making inroads in Germany's 
traditional export market.35 
German workers are among the world's highest paid. The average hourly wage, 
which includes all associated benefits, is $25, compared to $15.50 for an American worker 
and $2 for a Polish worker. Labor costs are high because employers pay an additional 
80% above the cost of salaries in social benefits alone. These benefits include a 13th 
month Christmas bonus, over 30 days of paid vacation, and expensive apprenticeship 
programs.36 
The security net is comprehensive, and financed by the government (that is, the 
taxpayer). Unemployed workers receive indefinite benefits, including payments totalling 
67% of their former gross salary for the first 15 months that they are on the dole. Unions 
operate under a "co-determination" concept whereby the unions have an equal share in 
company decisions. For example, Volkswagen maintains 30,000 excess workers on its 
rolls in Lower-Saxony, partly out of fear of the consequences of laying off workers in an 
already depressed local economy. Unemployment in that region hovers over 10%. 
Another reason is the union's power in Volkswagen. Volkswagen is exceptional in that 
the union actually controls over 50% of the company's decision-making power, and unions 
are reluctant to lay off workers.37 
According to some analyses, German workers are even losing their competitive 
edge. In one study, American workers are estimated to be 20% more productive than 
German ones. Half of all business revenues are transferred to the government through 
taxation, and worker wages are having a tough time keeping up with the cost of living.38 
Even though German workers get paid a lot of money, living expenses in Germany are 










own home, gas prices are four times higher than in the United States, and all goods incur 
a 15% value-added tax. 
Regulations also hamper business. Merchandise cannot be marked down unless it 
is uniformly done and only during certain time periods like the pre-set summer and winter 
close out sales. Weekend shopping is non-existent after 2 p.m. Saturdays, except for one 
for one Saturday a month, when stores keep late hours. Shops (other than those located 
in airports or train stations) are required to remain closed on Sundays and must also close 
at 6:30 p.m. on weekdays (except on Thursdays). Because of the increased concern for 
the environment, businesses must adhere to strict garbage disposal and regulatory laws. 
Obtaining a building license can be difficult. For example, if an entrepreneur wants to 
build a chemical plant in Germany, he could wait almost two years before receiving 
authorization.  In France, that waiting period for the same purpose is only 6 months.39 
Finally, the German people are no longer willing to make the sacrifices that their 
forefathers made during the West German economic miracle of the late 1940's and 1950's. 
Instead of unions working together with management and the government as one team, 
they now fight each other over a piece of the ever-shrinking pie. If the average German 
worker cut back the number of vacation days and took only as many as an American 
worker, Germany's GNP would increase by 7%. In 1993, some unions were able to win 
a 3.2% wage increase, increase Christmas bonuses, and add another hour to the work 
week even though the German economy was suffering through a recession and was trying 
to cope with the staggering costs of reunification. Adding another hour to the 35-hour 
week exacerbates an already high unemployment rate and increases pay checks by 3 
percent. Unions were also able to bargain for eastern German workers, who will by 1996 
receive 100% of the wages that a western German worker earns, regardless of 
productivity.40 
I.  CONCLUSION 
Although this chapter paints a gloomy picture of the prospects for the German 
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situation. It is also unfair to place the blame for Germany's economic mistakes, especially 
the ones dealing with the reunification costs, solely on the federal government. Clearly, 
the political issues surrounding German reunification and the increasing flood of refugees 
caused Bonn to make some hasty decisions which seemed to be wise in 1990. 
Germany's economy has also shown some recent signs of improvement. Economic 
growth in the former GDR is expected to top 9-10% in 1994.41 Unemployment in that 
region is on the downswing with the rate now below 15%. That is a significant 
psychological development since the unemployment rate hovered over 15% for over a 
year 42 
The state is also developing new economic stimulus programs, including the 
relaxation of some stringent regulations in order to boost private investments. Corporate 
taxes will be reduced by 6%, easier business start-up licensing practices will be 
implemented, and subsidies for the eastern half of the country will be decreased. Most of 
these new programs are prefaced with the word 'solidarity' and reflect a more genuine 
cost-sharing approach to reunification efforts. The purposes of these programs are to mold 
the country into one, to allow the former GDR states to start their own economic boom, 
to create a feeling of confidence among citizens, and to eliminate hand-outs.43 That does 
not mean, though, that Germans will not have to pay more taxes. A 7.5% "solidarity 
surcharge" will be implemented in 1995 for the sake of furthering economic reunification. 
It is too early to tell whether and to what extent these programs will work. However, 
initial signs look positive.44 
In summation, Germany has the means to return itself to its former economic 
prosperity. The country has a disciplined work force, one that is bent on saving its 
money, and skilled enough to produce the best quality items in the world. More 
important, though, are the political and societal ramifications to Germany if economic 
reunification does not quickly occur. There is a growing Ostalgie, or nostalgia for the 
East, among former East German citizens, which could cause political problems for the 
ruling coalition. In addition, Kohl's majority lead was reduced to only ten seats in the 

















former rote Socken ("red sock" or Communist) elements as well. The red socks are in 
reference to the creeping ex-communist influence in the Bundestag as a result of the seats 
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V. ANALYSIS OF HANS-PETER SCHWARZ'S THESIS AND CONCLUSION 
When Hans-Peter Schwarz wrote his book, Die, gezaehmten Deutschen (The Tame 
Germans) in 1985, he made a remarkable argument that Germany should amend its foreign 
policy approach. Germany's failure to acknowledge power politics in the midst of 
"European tensions and a shaky world order" was, he contended, detrimental to 
Germany's interests. For Germany to "aussteigen" (exit) the stage of European politics 
was simply not possible.1 Germany could not hide from its position in Europe and must 
accept, despite its inclinations, its fair share of international responsibilities. These 
pronouncements a decade ago accurately portray the current political atmosphere in Europe 
and the prevailing attitudes toward Germany and within Germany. 
Power politics is accepted as a legitimate foreign policy approach, albeit in a 
different form than in the classical sense of the term, by not only the United States but by 
European states as well. Independent states fear for their survival, in view of destabilizing 
factors such as religious fundamentalism, ethnic tensions, and economic disparity.   In 
addition, with no identifiable foe forcing countries to band together, large and small states 
have more latitude to pursue their own interests.2 Nations are also finding it increasingly 
more important to consider all possible policy options in order to combat the emerging 
post-Cold War security threats. Diplomacy, humanitarian missions, collective security 
arrangements (such as the U.N. and the CSCE/OSCE), and economic sanctions all have 
their uses, as in Haiti and Korea. However, the failures in the former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, and Iraq with these well-intentioned political approaches - as well as the general 
inability to reach a multilateral consensus on more assertive measures - suggest that 
stronger political action may become necessary in order to achieve desired results. Jacques 
Delors, when he was still the President of the European commission, stated: 
We should not have stated on the outbreak of hostilities [in the Balkans] 
that we would not use force. Even if military intervention was debatable, 
it made little sense to signal to the warring factions that they would not 
have to face the military might of the West. In other words, without a 
plausible threat to use force, we needlessly undermined the credibility of 













In regard to the political atmosphere, Schwarz was correct when he foresaw the 
current geopolitical stage for Germany. As Henry Kissinger stated in 1994, the post-Cold 
War era has caused a breakdown in the "traditional concepts of power." One can today 
be powerful by being economically dominant but militarily weak (Japan) or vice versa 
(Russia). According to Kissinger, the post-Cold War international system will be marked 
by "fragmentation" and at the same time, "globalization". There will be an increase in the 
number of major powers, each pursuing its own interests. As a result of World War II, 
decolonization, and the Cold War, the traditional European powers have lost their former 
pre-eminence, and the political world no longer rotates around a European axis. The 
former West European powers are now in a position where they must integrate into a 
political and economic bloc in order to muster enough power to contend with the world's 
emerging competitors (China, Russia, the United States, Japan, and "possibly" 
India).4 
This thesis does not contest Hans-Peter Schwarz 's assessment of the political 
atmosphere or deny his argument that Europe is faced with a number of international 
dilemmas, some of which could even destabilize a strong country like Germany. 
However, this thesis has argued that Schwarz may have underestimated Germany's 
capacity and resolve to define and defend its national interests. 
Contrary to Hans-Peter Schwarz's arguments, Germany does have concrete 
national interests which are defended by German politicians. However, these interests are 
purposely limited due to legitimate and understandable internal and external constraints. 
In other words, the analysis in this thesis holds that Germany is pursuing a proper level 
of "responsible politics", one which even incorporates a hidden level of power politics. 
For Germany to pursue assertive policies more openly would not necessarily be in the 
Federal Republic's best interests and could even be to Germany's detriment. Although 
many American and British officials may want a more assertive German state;5 other 
countries, especially those in the East, still resent and fear Germany.6 As a result, the 
Federal Republic is constantly placed in the dilemma of balancing its security policy 
priorities within this polarized band of diverging foreign and domestic factors. 
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Finally, this chapter argues that Hans-Peter Schwarz's analysis overlooks some 
important explanations of why Germans have supposedly shunned power politics. His 
assessment that Germans have forgotten the uses of power politics because they have been 
indoctrinated with incessant pacifistic teachings and have been subjugated to moralistic 
politics may not be entirely correct. There are other conscientious reasons why the 
German federation does not pursue more assertive policy approaches. Many Germans 
seem satisfied with their comfortable lives and have no real desire to involve themselves 
with risky external "experiments" - especially when the Federal Republic of Germany's 
political practices since 1949 have been more successful and safer than its politics of the 
first half of the century.7 
A.  GERMAN ASSERTTVENESS 
Although Hans-Peter Schwarz tends to claim otherwise, Germany does have 
national interests which have been publicly stated by the ruling coalition in Bonn. 
Incidentally, this coalition has not been as fragile as many coalition organizations. This 
government, under Helmut Kohl, has ruled Germany since 1982. German interests are 
focused, relatively limited in scope, and fit within the parameters of a nation-state that 
seems to have no foreseeable aspirations of achieving a global super power status. Global 
responsibilities are treated as "obligations", and have to date consisted solely of limited 
humanitarian and low key U.N.-sanctioned operations. In addition, Germany's current 
interests are not unique to the post-Cold War time period. The Federal Republic's interests 
(peace, security, prosperity, national unity, etc.) have maintained their essential character 
since 1949, and some of them have been satisfied since the end of the Cold War - above 
all, German unification and the withdrawal of former Soviet forces from Germany. 
However, as outlined in Chapter n, Germany has since taken wider steps, perceived by 
















1. The Former Yugos 
Although Germany has not participated in ground or combat air operations over the 
former Yugoslavia, Germany's Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, is quick to point out that 
Germany has adopted a course of "positive entanglement" in Bosnia. Germany provides 
10% of the aid going to Bosnia, has flown over 1000 relief flights into the region,8 and 
enforces the embargoes against the warring factions by assisting in AWACs overflights and 
participating in the naval embargo in the Adriatic Sea. 
Germany is still involved in the Balkans even though, as Hans-Peter Schwarz 
points out, this region is not as strategically important as it was at the turn of the century.9 
Even when the Balkans were of strategic importance to Prussia, Bismarck and Kaisers 
Wilhelm I and II were careful in their Balkan diplomacy because the Balkans were then 
considered (even more today) the "powder keg" of Europe. Accusing Germany of doing 
too little in the Balkans and labelling its restrained behavior a sign of pathetic non- 
involvement would not be just. During Germany's acceptable and legitimate periods of 
foreign diplomacy, specifically the periods from 1871-1914, 1919-1933, and 1949 to the 
present, Germany has purposely stayed out of the Balkans (at least militarily). The area 
did not then fit within the parameters of Germany's Mitteleuropa. Prussia feared pan- 
Slavism, and were it not for Austro-Hungary's tendency to venture into the Yugoslav 
region, which was ironically caused by Germany preventing the Hapsburg Empire from 
venturing northward, Bismarck might have involved himself even less in the area.10 
2. Eastern Europe 
Eastern Europe is proving to be a region of growing German activity and 
assertiveness. The Bundesrepublik is more involved in the affairs of Eastern Europe than 
the rest of the world.  Jolyon Howorth stated that: 
The task of creating political, social, and demographic stability and, 
eventually, economic prosperity in Eastern Europe is one of Herculean 
dimensions which, to date, Germany has assumed to a degree which puts 
all other countries to shame. 
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Germany, despite being burdened with its own social and economic unification, has 
become a major stabilizer in the volatile East - an area which not only affects Germany's 
security interests but also those of the United States and the rest of the Western world." 
In September 1994, the German Economic Ministry stated that Germany had contributed 
or pledged 88 billion dollars of government aid to Russia and Eastern Europe since 1989, 
which was more than the amount contributed by any other Western government. In 
addition, second only to the United States, Germany is the major contributor of private 
investment to the region.12 Although Germans can proudly say that they contribute more 
to the Eastern European region than does the rest of the world, one should not be misled 
into believing that this aid reflects only selfless German generosity. This aid is being used 
to further German national interests. The Bundesrepublik does not want a mass migration 
of Aussiedlers (ethnic Gentians) entering the Federal Republic from Russia, and is doing 
whatever it can to make their lives in Russia as pleasant as possible. Also, with this aid, 
Germany paid for the removal of Russian forces from German soil. 
3. Economic Power 
Another significant example of Germany pursuing its interests is its use of 
economic power. Pursuing economic power is not just a post-1945 German phenomenon. 
However, Germany's implementation of its foreign policy has changed significantly since 
its defeat in World War n. As a result, economic foreign policy has become the ersatz 
for military force. This has even been acknowledged by Hans-Peter Schwarz, who gave 
the following analogy in 1971 to describe Germany's post-1945 foreign policy: 
It is not difficult to look at the economic orientation of [Germany's] 
postwar foreign policy as the product of the hangover of a madman who, 
having slept off his intoxication with power, devotes himself to quietly 
raking in money by the barrel.13 
What Schwarz and others have failed to acknowledge is that Germany has always 






















unavoidably done so because of its trade structure with Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe, 
including Russia, has historically provided Germany with primary and raw material 
imports in exchange for more expensive consumer and capital-intensive goods. This has 
created a significant trade imbalance in Germany's favor. For example, Germany 
commanded 45% of Russia's import trade, whereas Russia controlled only 13% of 
Germany's import trade, and this in 1914!14 
In World War II, the Third Reich was able to control Eastern European exports and 
imports, and eventually forced these states to become dependent on German supplies and 
spare parts.15 After World War II, Germany continued its economic domination of the 
East, and by 1959, became the Soviet Union's biggest Western trading partner despite the 
anti-German rhetoric coming from Moscow at the time. Germany also used grain exports 
and financial credit programs to gain the freedom of German P.O.W. 's in the USSR and 
of citizens of East Germany. The Federal Republic also used economic measures to 
secure oil and gas supplies from Russia. Were it not for the Bundesrepublik 's 300 million 
dollar aid package to Hungary in 1989, the likelihood that Hungary would have opened 
its borders is questionable.16 Hungary precipitated the fall of the Berlin Wall when it 
opened its borders in September 1989. 
4. German Interests Come First 
The Bundesbank is a powerful financial institution, with a leading position in the 
financial affairs of Europe and the rest of the world. As an example supporting 
Kissinger's point that countries do not necessarily have to be great military powers to be 
dominant states, the Bundesbank certainly helps the Federal Republic fit those power 
parameters. The collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992 was 
considered, by some analysts, to be the key event leading to the destruction of hopes for 
near-term economic unity in the European Union and a prime example of German 
domination. As an aside, political imperatives seem to dictate that political unity still be 
pursued prior to monetary unity. However, economists will tend to disagree with such 
priorities.   How can a political union come to a consensus on such critical issues as 
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budgetary matters, defense burden-sharing, and social welfare policies without first settling 
on a common financial program? 
As Josef Joffe has stated, Germany came to the bargaining table armed in 1990 
with "monetary dominance" just as it had come with "dreadnoughts" prior to the First 
World War. Chancellor Kohl was wearing two hats in 1990, one as a Europeanist and one 
as the Bundeskanzler, and the chancellorship won out. Although Germany had earlier 
forced the European Community to stay within the stringent budgetary, inflationary, and 
exchange rate limits as outlined in the EMS, Germany, on its own accord, violated those 
same principles in 1990 and went on a fiscal spending spree in order to pay for its 
unification. As the government spent more money, the Bundesbank took increasingly 
drastic measures to stem inflation and raised interest rates in 1992, to the point that they 
were almost three times the 1988 level. Instead of taking a more disciplined fiscal 
approach to Germany's unification for the sake of European monetary unity and cohesion, 
Chancellor Kohl adopted fiscal measures designed to alleviate Germany's own economic 
problems and enhance his party's prospects for electoral success. According to Joffe's 
analysis, Helmut Kohl essentially put German interests over European integration efforts.17 
According to Joffe, a similar analogy can be made with America's domination of 
the Bretton Woods currency exchange system in the 1960's, whereby the United States 
forced its allies to purchase devalued dollars, fresh from the printing presses, in order to 
finance its war in Vietnam. Germany, the strongest country in the EMS, took the same 
approach in 1990-1992 by sharply raising interest rates, which caused other European 
countries to scramble out of the EMS structure.18 
What then are the prospects of Germany pursuing a less self-serving economic 
foreign policy? If one considers Germany's rejection of President Clinton's IMF bailout 
package for Mexico in February 1995 as any indication, it seems unlikely that Germany 









B. POLITICAL CULTURE 
Although Germany's political culture was analyzed in some detai] in Chapters I and 
III, it is important to at this point to clarify the differences between Schwarz 's 
interpretation of why Germans shun power politics and what this thesis suggests are the 
truly influential circumstances affecting German political attitudes towards an increased 
global role. Hans-Peter Schwarz has argued that Germans have been immunized from 
power politics because of their historic past; the moralistic and responsible policies of the 
post-1945 German governments; and the policies favored by the media, the churches, and 
the schools. As a result, Schwarz has argued, Germans tend to harbor a simplistic naivete 
towards power politics and armed conflicts. Media accounts covering security issues are 
quick to include Germany's past atrocities and tend to dwell more on the aspects of death 
and destruction than on the political rationales behind the use of force. Examples of this 
simplistic attitude, within the media, over the use of force are provided below: 
1) Die Welt - "We hope the Bundeswehr does not interpret the decision of the 
Karlsruehe court [in reference to the July 1994 decision allowing Bundeswehr troops to 
participate in 'out of area' missions] to allow for the motto 'The Germans to the Front!'"20 
2) Interviewer from Per Spiegel - "By deploying Tornados against Serbian[s],... 
Germany would become a party to the war...The Germans would shoot Serbs dead."21 
Although DerJipiegel is often characterized as being a left-of-center magazine, one cannot 
ignore the fact that it is the largest-circulating news magazine in Germany, with over one 
million readers.22 
Although Schwarz 's thesis seems irrefutable on this account, at least three other 
factors seem to weigh just as heavily towards Germany's supposed Machtvergessenheit. 
These factors are scarcely mentioned in Schwarz's analysis, yet this thesis argues that they 
help to explain German attitudes toward involvement in power politics. 
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1. An Attitude Of Moral Aloofness 
Many Germans seem to exhibit an attitude of moral aloofness, implying that "we 
are above barbaric warfighting." This prevailing attitude seems to account for German 
ambivalence towards power politics issues. According to Josef Joffe, Germans go through 
a complex decision-making process involving "cool cost benefit calculations" when 
deciding on a particular foreign policy course. Moral issues must be considered, interests 
are factored in with risks, financial costs are weighed against the nation's conscience; and 
legitimate historical sensitivities all become part of the decision-making process.23 
Some Germans tend to feel that they should not burden themselves with 
responsibilities regarding foreign conflicts because of their nation's historical past. 
However, as some Germans have noted, these "historical arguments" tend to act as a front 
for "historical excuses".24 These excuses tend to allow Germany to place itself in a "ring- 
side seat" position whereby the Federal Republic participates diplomatically or 
economically - but not militarily - in helping settle highly publicized global dilemmas. 
These tactics reduce Germany's checkbook balance in some instances, but the German 
people benefit by walking away from problems with "clean hands" as far as military 
involvement is concerned. Other countries, however, such as the United States, France, 
and Great Britain, get stuck with the "dirty work" of having to commit troops into action. 
Some Germans - at least 40% of those asked in a poll conducted after reunification 
- preferred a Germany similar to Switzerland: a country hidden away from problems, a 
center of financial affluence, and a state respected by the entire community of nations.25 
Germans have not, however, forgotten power politics. They understand its importance and 
fully comprehend its various aspects and purposes. Germans accept power politics and 
have actually supported armed intervention - as long as it does not involve themselves. 
At the time of the Persian Gulf War, one poll showed that 72 % of the Germans agreed 
with the way the Allied coalition was conducting the war, including the bombing of Iraq. 
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Although there is growing optimism on the part of the ruling conservatives in Bonn 
that Germans will eventually accept a greater international role for themselves, convincing 
constituents that such a role should be adopted is becoming more of a challenge than some 
expected. Germans approach increased international responsibilities with "nervousness", 
and some will even argue, with dismay. In 1994, when asked about the situation in the 
former Yugoslavia, 53 % of Germans polled in the former West German states opposed 
plans to send German ground forces to Bosnia and 51 % opposed sending combat aircraft. 
On the other hand, 53% believed that there should be more U.N. military involvement in 
the Balkans.27 
Excluding Hitler, German statesmen have placed limitations on their foreign policy 
aspirations. Although Germany had participated in limited colonial excursions outside of 
Europe, its foreign policy has remained primarily focused on Central Europe. As 
Bismarck stated, "your map of Africa is very nice, but my map of Africa lies in Europe."28 
American policy makers have been frustrated by what they perceive to be a lack of 
European resolve to accept involvement in areas outside the immediate confines of Europe, 
even though areas such as the Middle East affect European interests just as much as they 
affect American interests.20 
2. A Domestic Orientation 
The second reason for Germany's "reticence" in foreign affairs - a term used by 
Ronald Asmus - stems from the tumultuous problems associated with Germany's 
economic and societal unification. The ruling coalition has been forced to use political 
tactics designed to steer Germans towards a more outward-looking, political orientation 
in spite of their domestic burdens. These measures have included appeals to the nation's 
conscience - something that was developed over time, thanks to the more moralistic 
elements in German society. Politicians are also incorporating foreign policy issues into 
Germany's domestic agenda. 
However, there are limits to Germany's security policy. It would be unwise for 
a German politician to attempt to convince his constituents that they should give up their 
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entitlements and pay more taxes in order to pay for an enlarged foreign policy role. 
Chancellor Kohl, Germany's senior ranking advocate for an expansion of Germany's 
international responsibilities, has nevertheless tried to influence his nation to take a more 
assertive stance towards its international "obligations." His use of the term "kollektiver 
Freizeitpark" (social amusement park) to describe Germany's expensive social system is 
one such example of the Chancellor trying to push the nation away from its old "spoiled" 
ways and assume its proper position as a responsible power in the new world order.30 
Chancellor Kohl is still forced to acknowledge the limits of Germany's involvement 
in foreign affairs. These internal and external constraints were analyzed in previous 
chapters and play a major role in the conduct of Germany's security policy. Germans 
cannot ignore the negative episodes in their nation's past. Many groups in other nations 
still harbor resentment and prejudices against Germans. Some of this resentment stems 
from ignorance, jealousy, past memories, cultural differences, or political convenience. 
Serbia comes to mind on the last point.31 
The real issue affecting Germans is domestic politics. Not only is economic 
reunification taking its toll on the German pocket book, but the problem of bringing the 
"Ossis" and "Wessis" together as one people may only be solved by the next generation 
of Germans.32 German citizens consider themselves overtaxed (although they are not taxed 
to the extent of citizens of some other EU countries33), large numbers of people are 
unemployed, and environmental issues are commanding the attention of the general public. 
Some analysts predict that complete economic unification will require another ten years. 
Politically, that may take too long. The recent gains by the Party of Democratic Socialism 
(the former Socialist Unity Party, the Communists) in the October 1994 election and the 
growth in "Ostalgia" are not positive signs that German patience is willing to wait a 
decade.34 
In addition, Western European countries tend to attribute greater importance to 
domestic issues than to European unification efforts.35 This adds friction to the integration 
process and keeps citizens inwardly focused instead of looking more outward. The 
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tolls in order to alleviate traffic congestion; expansion of roadways and tunnels at the 
expense of the environment; the forced purchase of poorer quality foodstuffs, such as 
bananas, from EU territorial areas; outside attacks on Germany's food purity laws; 
garbage and waste disposal problems; and issues surrounding high technology joint 
ventures with other states.36 Outsiders may view the above concerns as being "trivial" in 
nature, but they appear to captivate the interests and emotions of average Germans. 
Adding to the inwardness tendency is a growing Verdrossenheit - apathy towards 
the established political system - among German citizens. For example, over 91.1% of all 
eligible West Germans voted in the national election in 1972. This compares to 84.3% in 
1987 and 78.8% (of all Germans) in 1990. These percentages are an indication of 
increasing apathy toward the political sectors of the state.37 Voter turn out for the recent 
Länder elections was even worse. Even though a voter turn out rate of even 60% would 
be high compared to American standards, it is viewed as a cause for alarm in Germany, 
where the citizens are considered disciplined and view voting as a duty, and where 
elections are held on non-working Sundays. 
Superwahljahr (1994) was a difficult election year for Kohl's ruling government. 
His "come from behind" win in October 1994 was a shallow victory for his coalition. The 
coalition lost seats in the Bundestag and currently holds only a ten-seat majority. Klaus 
Kinkel, whose party was reeling from severe losses in previously held state-wide elections, 
was hoping for an improvement in his party's standing in the October 1994 election. 
However, in the month prior to election day, the opposition SPD party hardly 
acknowledged foreign policy issues in the budget debates. This frustrated Kinkel, who as 
Germany's Foreign Minister, holds his party's most visible position.38 Although there are 
substantial policy differences among Germany's political parties, international security 
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3. A Free-Rider Approach 
The final reason that Germans tend to avoid power politics can arguably be based 
on the "free rider" theory.3" Josef Joffe uses a different phrase, "the partaking of public 
goods."40 Americans often call it a problem of inequitable "burden-sharing." Whatever 
one calls it is inconsequential; the real issue is that Germans hesitate to participate in 
classical forms of power politics - especially responsibility-sharing in enterprises involving 
military risks - when other countries will do it for them. Germany no longer has to pursue 
a solo foreign policy course as it once did, from 1871 through 1945. There are no more 
"two front" worries. With the help of the United States and other allies, Germany now 
enjoys economic prosperity, friendly borders, and the security of the most sought-after 
collective defense organization in the world (NATO). 
According to Joffe, the United States provides Western Europe and Germany the 
"public good" of conventional and nuclear arms protection. Everyone in NATO can stand 
under the security umbrella, and "others need not work for it" or hold it up as long as the 
United States is willing to do the job. Joffe states that the required "great organizer" is 
the United States, which on repeated occasions has provided the necessary resources and 
assets - to include leadership - in order to protect European interests. For example, the 
United States was the great organizer during the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War. 
When there was no great organizer, as was the case in the 1920's and the 1930's with the 
League of Nations, the end result was World War JJ. In short, Joffe concludes that 
"nations left to their own devices will not necessarily do what duty requires." In this 
particular case, Germany is to some extent a "free-rider", although Chancellor Kohl 
deserves credit for trying to change that image; and the United States remains the great 
organizer - albeit a cautious one - providing security and protection, which some feel may 
not be a lasting thing.41 
According to Joffe, Americans from the political left and the right have been 
looking on Europeans as "parasites".42 It is becoming difficult for American 
















political agenda. The American media adds to this inward-looking tendency by focusing 
their coverage on predominantly domestic topics. Media companies are finding it a lot 
cheaper to report on events in America than to travel overseas. 
American politicians have always been openly vocal about the inadequacy of allied 
contributions to NATO, dating as far back as that organization's inception. However, with 
the demise of the Soviet Union, there are increasing calls from the United States Congress 
to have Europeans pay more of the costs of stationing American troops in Europe. The 
following comments by Congressman David Bonior of Michigan (now the House minority 
whip) were recorded in Congressional debates on the Frank Amendment - an amendment 
calling on the Europeans to pay for 75% of the cost of stationing American troops in 
Europe by 1998: 
The lesson [to be learned from Japan increasing its burden sharing to 50% 
of the non-personnel costs associated with the U.S. military presence in 
Japan] is that when you get tough - you get respect. And when you get 
respect - you get results. With this amendment, we are saying that it is 
time for our European allies to pay their fair share, too. It's not like they 
cannot afford to pay...this year for example, we will spend at least $4 
billion - not counting salaries - to defend Germany. Yet, Germany has 
wage rates that are about 140 percent of ours. They have national health 
care, parental leave, child care, a national job-training program, and a 
month's paid vacation for all their workers. And to top it all off, last 
quarter, Germany ran a trade surplus with the United States of about $10 
billion. Yet, we are spending $4 billion to defend them? It doesn't make 
any sense. 
43 Incidentally, the Frank Amendment passed in the House by a vote of 268 to 144. 
Some Americans are convinced that Germany is a "free rider" benefiting from 
American military protection. Although elements of American society still fear a resurgent 
Germany, many more Americans - including President Clinton - believe that Germany is 
not doing enough to help the United States "shoulder" international responsibilities.44 To 
back up this argument, Gompert and Kugler note that Germany has the world's 4th largest 
economy and is the second per capita "gas-guzzler". Yet, the German military can only 
manage to contribute a brigade-size ground force for "out of area" missions.45  Such a 
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small force would hardly be sufficient for combat situations, unless they were relatively 
limited in scope. Statistics such as these make Germany vulnerable to "free-rider" 
accusations from United States law makers who argue that the Germans enjoy American 
military protection while they dedicate resources to their elaborate social welfare system. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The dynamics of German foreign policy are complex and have provoked a 
polarization among political analysts. Some, such as John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, 
Jacob Heilbrunn, and some European politicians (especially those in Eastern Europe), take 
a seemingly alarmist view of German "assertiveness." Others, such as Presidents Bush and 
Clinton, General Klaus Naumann, and Hans-Peter Schwarz take an opposite approach, and 
are critical of what they view as an ambivalent Germany that is not inclined to seek its 
proper role in shouldering international security responsibilities. 
Although some have offered the suggestion that Germany is still emerging into its 
role as a "normal" state, this thesis has shown that German security policy has maintained 
a steady course despite the revolutionary changes that have occurred in Europe. The 
German Bürger has been comfortable with his nation's present position in the world order. 
The Federal Republic's cautious international security choices have given a sense of 
tranquility to the post-1945 generation of West Germans, compared to earlier periods. 
Since the reunification of 1989-1990, West German attitudes based on the FRG's 
experiences in 1949-1989 have been increasingly accepted by East Germans, although East 
Germans retain distinctive views on some matters. Of course, periods of tensions such as 
the Berlin blockade and the stationing of INF missiles in the early 1980's have come and 
gone. However, Germans are living comfortable lives, enjoy some of the world's highest 
standards of living, and are able to frequently get away from their structured lives and take 
elaborate vacations. 
This thesis concludes that, contrary to what Hans-Peter Schwarz has argued, 
Germans are well aware of power politics and are able to use its applications within 

















may be summed up in three points: appealing to the public's sense of responsibility to 
further political goals, implementing "assertive" diplomatic and economic measures on 
occasion, and supporting the right of others to use military force. 
German security interests are limited, and Germany's military capabilities can 
arguably be considered modest for a country of such great economic, technological, and 
political importance. However, to expand its international security roles and obligations 
may not be in Germany's best interests. With responsibilities come liabilities. These 
liabilities could exact a heavy toll on Germany's conscience, incur negative reactions from 
public opinion, and affect its political well-being. With domestic factors and a continuing 
awareness of its troubled past being the dominating forces affecting Germany's foreign 
policy, the incentives for Germany to pursue greater global security responsibilities will 
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